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By DON A. AFFELDT

Comment on Current Issues

What Must this Candidate Do to be Saved?
I am having a daydream in which Richard Nixon,
the thirty-seventh President of the United States, sends
a rich young lawyer to my study and we engage in the
following conversation. He begins :
"As you doubtless know, Mr. Nixon's briefing officers
do their best to keep the President informed on what
journals of informed opinion like the Cresset are saying
about him. He has noted that you have criticized his
handling of the Presidency on several occasions in the
past and, being eager to learn from his critics, he has
asked me to consult with you about what he might do to
improve his work.
The matter is especially urgent because, as you know,
he will be offering himself for re-election just twelve
months hence, and he would dearly like by that time
to have demonstrated to your satisfaction that he deserves to be retained in office. Yet since you seem to
disapprove of much of what he does as President, he
suspects that it will take at least a year to alter his course
in the directions you suggest. So without further delay,
may I ask you to reveal what in your estimation he must
do to deserve being saved as President?"
"I'm flattered you should ask. I wouldn't have thought
that a President so noted for keeping his own counsel
would be so eager to consult his critics."
"You needn't attribute large-mindedness to him, if
it would upset you too much to entertain the possibility
that he is not as small-minded as you seem to think he
is. Begin with your assumption, and suppose that the
President anticipates an extremely close election in
1972, such that he will need your vote, and the votes of
those who share your views, in order to preserve himself in office. The question, then, is a very practical one:
What would Richard Nixon have to do to get you to
vote for him in 1972?"
"Simple. He could arrange to have the Democrats
nominate a man who, compared to Nixon, would be a.
disaster as President."
"Mr. Affeldt, you're not being very helpful. In the
first place, even Presidential powers have their limitations, and Presidents of one party have very little control over whom the opposition will select to run against
them. In the second place, I wonder whether the possibility you suggested would work, even if he could arrange it. For isn't it true that in the last analysis you'd
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vote for any Democrat in preference to any Republican?'
"No."
"Even so, Mr. Nixon doesn't want to risk your producing, at the moment you enter the polls, a chain of
reasoning which would justify your voting for his opponent in spite of your prior views. He would much
prefer earning your positive support, so that he could
count on your vote even if the Democrats were to come
forth with a candidate who was in his own right very
attractive."
"Well, I confess that I have never much liked Nixon,
so the thought that I might actively support his bid for
election is pretty novel."
"As I say, I am concerned lest you be upset with new
thoughts. Yet some new thoughts on Mr. Nixon may,
in the light of recent developments, be essential if one's
opinion is to remain informed."
"What developments are you speaking of?"
"Take your pick: The forthcoming visit to China.
The Moscow summit meeting. The President's decisive action on the world monetary problem. His strong
moves to fight inflation here at home. The fact that he
recently nominated two top-drawer men for the Supreme Court. Things like this."
"Suppose I grant that Mr. Nixon has taken some bold
initiatives in foreign policy, and that his New Economic
Policy seems to be a vast improvement over his original
game-plan. I'll even grant that the nominations of Powell and Rehnquist for the Supreme Court deserve
applause - if only because for a time it seemed that
Nixon was going to pull another Haynsworth/Carswell
by nominating Mr. Friday and Judge Lillie to the Court.
But what follows from these concessions? Just because
a man is doing some things right, and other things not
so wrong as he has- or could have -done them doesn't
mean that he deserves to be re-elected. Other men might
do even better."
"Of course. There's always that possibility. But on the
other hand, a man whose track record looks pretty good
is sometimes preferable to an unknown quantity, particularly when so very much hangs on the choice. Which
brings me back to my original question: What would
Mr. Nixon's track-record have to show in order for you
to vote for him? You surely don't concede, do you, that
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A Daydream on the First Tuesday . ..

there's nothing Mr. Nixon could do to get your support
for re-election?!"
"Well, I. .. "
"For surely that's unreasonable . If you won't support
a man no matter what he does to deserve your support,
you're being prejudiced!"
"Quite so. And of course I deny being prejudiced. So
yes, obviously, there's something Nixon could do to
enlist my support. He could. . ."
"Now be careful, please, what you say. You don't want
to require too much of the man , for that wouldn't be
reasonable either. I mean you wouldn't want to require
that he gives up his moderately conservative philosophy,
for example, and become a total liberal; for if that's the
sort of change you require, you're back to claiming that
there's nothing he could do to win you over - short of
becoming a totally different man. And since that's not
possible, it's not very reasonable to expect it of him,
or of anyone."
"I'm half-inclined to go along with that judgment,
except that a counter-example sticks in my mind: Richard Nixon. When you match his statements and actions
in the past with many of his statements and actions in
the present, it's awfully hard to remember you're talking about the same man. Take one example. When he
started in office, he implemented an economic policy
quite the opposite of what he's now doing, and even
vigorously defended his original game-plan against
proposals of the sort he is currently following. Now if
a man can be that changeable in three short years, what's
to prevent him from doing a flip-flop in other significant respects in the next year or five years? And if he's
the kind of man who can do that, what's unreasonable
about requiring it of him as a condition of supporting
him?"
"Mr. Affeldt you're jesting. The President is not nearly so chameleonic as you make him out to be. The New
Nixon is just the Old Nixon keeping up with the changing times."
"That's what I was afraid you'd say."
"But aren't you pleased that his policies are adaptable to changing conditions?"
"I'd rather he had policies which anticipated those
changes instead of policies formulated in reaction to
them. Better still would be a set of policies which brought
about the changes themselves, provided they're desirable. One wants leadership, not just competent rearguard crisis-management."
4

"But competent crisis-management, as you put it, is
awfully important."
"Of course it is, and I'd rather have it than not have
it. But is it the most we can hope for in a President?"
"It's all you're likely to get."
"So much the worse for our country."
"I'm not so sure. Bad leadership is still worse than
no leadership. But if it's all right with you, I'd like to
move beyond these generalities to some specifics. Are
you saying that Mr. Nixon could do nothing specific
to win your support?"
"No, I'm not saying that. I would say, however, that
no matter what specific things Nixon does which I might
approve, I still would want to evaluate his opponent
in the next election before deciding to support Mr. Nixon."
"Of course you would. No one would want you to do
differently - least of all Mr. Nixon himself. He wants
to win, but he naturally prefers to win for the right
reasons. What I'm trying to learn from you is what he
could do to furnish you with good reasons to vote for
him."
"He could have wound-down the war more quickly.
He could have scrapped his original economic gameplan before ever trying it in the first place. He could
have ... "
"Excuse me, but all these things you mention are
contrary-to-fact; you're talking about what he's already
done, and judging that. Obviously he can't do those
things differently, since they're already past history.
You aren't being very fair."
"I thought you said earlier that a man's track-record
is an acceptable basis for judgment as to whether or not
to support the man."
"It is. And I can't deny that Mr. Nixon's record contains a number of mistakes - at least in your view, as
that view has been articulated in your private and public
statements. But that's beside the point, for the purpose
of our present discussion. I'm asking you what might
yet be done, between now and the time of the election,
to enlist your support."
"OK. But at least you can see my reason for saying
that given what Nixon has done already, it might be
that nothing he could do in the next year would outweigh the debits already accumulated."
"Let's be candid, Mr. Affeldt. You don't really think
that Mr. Nixon's handling of the Presidency is all that
bad, do you?"
"No, I do not."
"In fact, wouldn't you grant that in some respects he
has done a very nice job?"
"Yes, I would."
"Will you then support him in 1972?"
"I don't know. I doubt it. But it's too early to say."
"Could you give me some suggestions, then, that I
could take back with me to Washington in order to give
Mr. Nixon some idea of what he might do between now
and 1972 to influence your decision in his favor?"
The Cresset

After the First Monday in November

"Since you ask, and have repeatedly asked , yes, I
will. I'll confine myself to making three negative and
three positive suggestions ; that way you won't have too
much to remember, and I , in turn, will have a simple
checklist to work with in the next twelve months. Here,
then, are my recommendations.
1. Mr. Nixon should stop using his Vice-President
as a mouthpiece for opinions unworthy of a President. If Mr. Nixon concedes the impropriety of
a President's expressing such views himself, he
ought not articulate those views through others.
2. Mr. Nixon should cancel the trade restrictions
and tariffs imposed by his New Economic Policy
at the earliest possible time.
3. Mr. Nixon should no longer permit J. Edgar
Hoover to remain as head of the FBI. In addition to endorsing a bad precedent for bureaucratic administration, Mr. Nixon's inaction on
this matter has resulted in considerable deteri-

oration in FBI morale and competence.
4. Mr.' Nixon should speed up the withdrawal of
troops from all of Southeast Asia and terminate
American military action in that part of the world
without delay.
5. Mr. Nixon should use the opportunities provided by the Wage and Price Boards of Phase II
of his New Economic Policy to redress some of
the grosser inbalances in the economic order.
6. Mr. Nixon should notably increase the amount
of Presidential support given to civil rights, consumer protection, and environmental causes.
So there you have it. If Mr. Nixon would take these
modest steps, I suspect I might find it very difficult to
oppose him in the upcoming election."
"You ask a great deal of him. But I will tell him what
you recommend."
"What I ask is not so very much. More positive leadership in manifestly worthy causes. Fulfillment of some of
his past promises. And a greater willingness to set his
sights high even though there are immediate political
gains to be made by lowering them. I don't ask that he
sell all he owns and give his money to the poor. Political salvation can be bought at a cheaper price than that."
The rich young lawyer gets up and leaves. I think I
detect a sparkle in his eye. I think he thinks it wouldn't
really be so hard to win me over to Mr. Nixon's camp.
He could be right. We'll see.

On Second Thought
Suppose you are reading a college text on physics.
The chapter on the universe at large states : "The stars
are little twinkling lights in the sky at night." You
would be shocked and repulsed by the statement, but
you cannot call it wrong. They really are little twinkling
lights in the sky at night. On the other hand, you must
say that the statement is not right. In such a book, for
such a purpose, it is silly. The stars are much more than
LTLITSAN.
Now suppose that you tried to write on <1. college level
about astronomy. You state that the stars are suns and
galaxies of suns consuming themselves in nuclear fission and fusion. Your book is read by some who see the
stars at night, and a great hue and cry is raised. You are
publicly accused of not saying that the stars are little
twinkling lights in the sky at night. What can you say?
The accusation is of course correct. You cannot show
that your accusers have misquoted you, or that they are
in error. The accusation stands against you, unrefuted.
In the society of those who do no more than look at
the sky at night, you are marked as an errorist. You have
not spoken the truth. Up and down the land the news is
spread: "N.N. denies that the stars are LTLITSAN."
November, 1971
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You can smile about it. You can, in conversation with
concerned friends, discountenance the rumors. Of
course the stars are LTLITSAN. Nothing will help you.
In the society of those who accuse you only one thing
will redeem you. You must write another book, in which
you state categorically and exclusively that "The Stars
Are Little Twinkling Lights In the Sky."
Most of those who read the book you did write were
happy to learn what the stars are. But those who look at
the sky at night blame you for destroying their vision.
If they had not listened to you, they too would know
that the stars are LTLITSAN.
The whole situation is foolish, because it is unnecessary and hopeless. You long for a friend with both influence and courage to speak as a prophet for God. You
and those who only look at the sky at night are both
right, because you both speak what is given you to
speak. More significantly, you are both wrong, because
neither one of you has fully comprehended the magnificence of those twinkling lights, the suns and galaxies
of sun·s. But only a man with influence and courage to
speak as a prophet for God will be able to reconcile you.
If we have no leader with such vision, we will perish.
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The Problem of Obscenity in American Society
By RAY C. RIST

Assistant Professor of Sociology
Portland State University
Portland, Oregon

In our complex and heterogeneous society faced with
the paramount issues of racism, poverty, pollution, the
nuclear arms race, and the decline of democracy, it is
somewhat paradoxical that so much attention and
energy is spent discussing and debating "what to do"
about sexual obscenity.I From the vantage point of one
grappling with the paramount issues, any discussion of
the issue of sexually explicit materials must seem frivolous and a luxury that American society can ill afford
at this time in history.
What could be the magnitude of the most extreme of
sexually explicit materials to compare with the poisoning of the air and water, or a welfare system that perpetuates tens of thousands of families at a near starvation
level year after year? Objectively, of course, sexual
material does not in any way compare with these problems. Explicit sexual material is a "psuedo" problem
when any attempt is made to evaluate it, for example,
in light of the threat of war and the perpetuation of war.
Though one may attempt to dismiss those who discuss
the issue of the "effects" of sexually explicit material
with a comment about their "lack of concern about real
issues," the issue does not fade away.
Our fellow citizens who are concerned with the "problem" of sexually explicit material speak of "moral degeneration," and "cultural corruption." And as several
of the dissenters to the final report of the Commission
on Obscenity and Pornography made clear, they believe
such material to be a chief causal variable in explaining
what they see as the increasing "amorality" or "immorality" of this society.
Were sexually explicit materials amenable to "objective" analysis in the sense that they could be tested,
evaluated, or measured for irrefutable conclusions as
to the "goodness" or "badness," the "corruption" or the
"edification," the "morality" or "immorality," then
there would be data upon which many of the present
dilemmas would be resolved. But sexually explicit material does not appear to be accurately evaluated by such
measures. The very criteria which one would wish to
evaluate (i.e. goodness or badness) are in themselves
subjectively determined and represent non-empirical
decisions.
This issue of the contextuality and subjective responses to sexually explicit material are taken up -in
some detail in an important article by Abraham Kaplan (1955). He writes of the relation of art to sexually
This article is excerpted and revised from the introduction to a forthcoming book, Pornography in America, edited by the author, and
to be published in the fall of 1972 by Aldine Press.
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explicit material and avers that "pornography" is not
art, nor is it esthetic. He does draw a distinction between that which is "pornographic" and that which is
"obscene." Obscenity is the "very stuff of imagination"
while pornography is merely "a spurious consummation." An important criterion for Kaplan in drawing
this and numerous other subtle distinctions throughout his article results from his emphasis upon the contextual situation in which the material is being evaluated and utilized. To be truly esthetic, the material
must be responded to in a manner that involves both
author and observer in the act of creation. Sexually
explicit material, Kaplan contends, does not do it. It
does not ask for an expression of self.
If sexually explicit material does not ask for an expression of self and becomes important to the individual only in highly specified situations, the definition
of pornography may be as John Gagon and William Simon suggest, "as elusive as mercury." Thus, in any
discussion of the effects of such material, its impact on
morality, and the role of the law as the formulator of
community mores, one may sense that no "closure" on
the topic is possible.
Yet to say that the issue has no closure is not to suggest that there are not significant foci about which the
debate and discussion revolve. There appear to be at
least two major perspectives that are most often utilized
and articulated - those of the "moralist" and the "libertarian." In the debate between these two groups, it
quickly becomes apparent that there are profound and
fundamental differences in how such material is defined, what effect it is perceived to have on the individual and the society, and what ought to be done about
it. In short, one is soon dealing with alternative interpretations of law, morality, and the role of the state in
the affairs of men.

One Man's Liberty is-Another Man's Laxity
The moralist would view the increasing proliferation
of sexual material into both the public and private
spaces of American society as an ominous sign of the
"decay" of the society. The libertarian, however, would
see the same increase in the presence of such material
as a positive sign of the change in traditional sexual
mores. The former would bemoan the laxity and the
weakening of traditional principles and the latter would
welcome the liberation and speak of a "post-puritan"
society. In response to what he believes to be happening
to this society, the moralist would call for the use of law
as an agent to restore and preserve dominant moral
The Cresset
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values. The liberalist would also call for the use of law,
but to further weaken the hold of the conventional and
traditional upon the private and consenting activities
of adults - in this case the use of sexually explicit material.
Yet the resolution of the debate does not appear to
be as simple as selecting an "either-or" response . The
moralist and the libertarian are in reality at the polar
extremes of a continuum of thought and opinion on the
issue. 2 Here again arise the perplexities. Were the
"answer" on one end or the other, there could be a resolution, save for the resistance of a few hold outs. But
those who take the two extreme positions find themselves arguing points that at other times and in other
circumstances, I suspect, they would not. The libertarian insists that "anything goes" while the moralist
posits "mine is the only way." In either instance; there
is a rigidity of perception that does not allow one to
view the vast middle ground . Thus, for example, the
dilemmas related to the philosophical and political
questions of censorship, both individual and institutional, do not lend themselves to the unambiguous
interpretation and analysis the extremes would suggest.
A further complication as one seeks to interpret the
issues of sexually explicit material is that in the attempt
to create distinct foci for analysis, there is an acute
awareness of the overlapping and interrelatedness of
the various categories. Questions of morals in a societal
sense are ultimately resolved by the institutionalization
of law; and the process by which one comes to have certain behavior regarded as legal and other behavior
regarded as illegal is essentially political. Consequently,
to discuss the illegality of some sexually explicit material without taking account of the dominant moral
values in the society is to create a fragmentation of reality. Clor (1969) has suggested one manner in which a
theoretical integration of the issues could be achieved:
This problem, the proper posture of the law toward
moral standards and opinions, is the central and
underlying issue in the obscenity debate. The problem has, essentially, two dimensions: a philosophical
or theoretical dimension and a practical or operational dimension. On the level of political and social
theory, what is required is reflection on the ends of
liberal democracy and the needs of civil society. On
the level of practice the problem consists largely in
arriving at definitions of the obscene which will be
appropriate to the circumstances of pre sent day
American society.
The remainder of this article will in part attempt to expand on the dimensions noted by Clor.
John Stuart Mill has written what is perhaps the most
frequently quoted libertarian position on the relation
of the individual to the state. He noted in his essay
On Liberty:
... that the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the
N ovem her, 1971

liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others. His own good, either physical or moral,
is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forebear because, in the opinions of
others, do do so would be wise, or even right.
Mill is obviously opposed to the intervention of the state
in the lives of individuals to decide what is correct or
right versus what is incorrect or wrong. In short, he rejects the notion of the state as paternalistic.

The Relation of Coercion to Virtue
Yet in Mill's statement lies the basis upon which one
can justify the use of law - to "prevent harm to others."
The conditions, however, by which one determines the
presence of "harm" are not spelled out. One finds that
the issue of the use of law to govern the actions of men is
not as unequivocal as a cursory reading of Mill might
suggest. The ambiguity appears to arise from the necessity of "balancing" the needs, rights, and responsibilities of both the individual and the state simultaneously.
The dilemmas are further compounded by the necessity of distinguishing the state from the collectivity of
persons who come together to form the state - in short,
the society. A state can theoretically be made or unmade. It is in a sense an artifical creation. A society,
however, is "natural" in that it exists so long as groups
of persons are in continuous interaction and share common concerns and values. It is this distinction which I
believe Clor had in mind when he noted, " .. .what is
required is reflection on the ends of liberal democracy
and the needs of civil society."
There appears to be at least two distinct theoretical
perspectives upon which those who sought to utilize
law as a coercive agent in order to prevent "harm to
others" have justified their case. As Skolnick (1968)
has elaborated on these, the first holds that law is no
more that a reflection of the values commonly held by
members of the society. Thus, the social mores of the
society are transformed into the laws of the state. William Graham Sumner held to this position and theorized that law represented a "crystallization of the mores
combined with collective power to maintain the status
quo." But Sumner also noted that the process by which
mores are transformed into law is not always readily
discernable. He posited that there exist both "public
morals" and "positive law" and that most of what comes
as change in the legal statutes results from a shifting of
the boundaries between those values perceived as residing in law and those perceived as residing in societal mores.
From a different perspective, the French sociologist
Emile Durkheim stressed the distinctions between the
state and its processes of legislation and the society with
its "collective consciousness." For Durkheim, the former
was the source of much that is rational and logical. It
7

is deliberative and methodical, while the collective morality of the society may be swayed by irrationalities of
passion, nationalism, and religious fervor. Thus, the
state becomes the source of guidelines for the society
which exists with obscure and indefinite "myths, (and)
religious or moral legends."
It would appear that in the current controversy over
the presence of sexually explicit material in American
society, these two positions have nearly merged in their
urging the use of law to repress such material. The use
of criminal law is suggested as the most rational and
effective means for controlling the "irrational" use of
sexually explicit material. Likewise, the instrumental
use of law becomes the goal of those who wish for society to convert its public morals into positive law. Those
who advocate this later position presume a general societal consensus on what constitutes "public morals."
With the merger of the two perspectives, there results
both a pull and push towards the legislative use of criminal law to control sexually explicit material.
If it is the case with explicit material that the two
distinct philosophical positions as represented by Sumner and Durkheim have coincided regarding the "posture of law towards moral standards and" opinions,"
the various components of that agreement should be
discernible. There are at least three propositions which
one can develop which would be congruent with both
positions.
The first is that sexually explicit material causes
"harm" and thus has deterimental effects both upon
the individual and society. For the individual, the harm
comes through stimulation to perform "anti-social"
acts after reading such material. There is an element
of "irrationality" for the individual to engage in that
which will cause harm to others. Thus, it is the right
and obligation of the state to intervene to protect both
the individual from himself and the state from the individual.3 From a societal perspective, it is necessary
to legislate against sexually explicit material in order
to protect the society from the corruption of moral principles which are defined as the foundations upon which
the state is built. Again for self-protection it is necessary to legislate against sexual material.
The difficulty in maintaining these positions, however, results from imprecision in specifying "effects"
and proscribing "cures." In general, there is discussion
of "moral decay," "look-at-what-happened-to-the-Romans" and the like. But the demonstration that individual pieces of material cause individual acts of decay ·
is all but impossible. Likewise, with the contentions
that sexually explicit material is the cause of wanton
crime, aberrant sexual behavior, and the disintegration
of the family, there are no methodological techniques
available that can subject these propositions to empirical investigation. Those who advance the position of the
negative effects of the material are often forced to fall
back and rely on statements such as those of President
Nixon who said, "Centuries of civilization and ten min8

utes of common sense tell us otherwise," when confronted with a presidential commission report which
reported no ill effects from the use of sexual material.

Deviancy and the Moral Entrepreneurs
A second proposition which would appear to represent a convergence between the two philosophical views
of Durkheim and Sumner would be that there is a general societal consensus that sexually explicit material
is distasteful and should therefore be forbidden. In
short, the claim is made that law should coincide with
consensus. Immorality is what everyone "knows" to be
immoral, therefore, there is no need for individual
discretion in deciding what is or is not to be acceptable.
Those who would follow Sumner in this regard would
suggest that all "right thinking citizens" would wish
to preserve their society and the value systems inherent
in that society. Thus, that material which threatens
societal consensus must be suppressed.
This position is often reduced to, "If everyone knows
it is wrong, then why not have a law against it." For
those who would see the state as the embodiment of rationality, the position would be that "if more people
·were aware of the facts," then they would agree that
the materials are distasteful and need to be dealt with
by the use oflaw. The consensus is latent due to the lack
of necessary information, but were that information
available, there could be no doubt but that controls are
necessary.
With this proposition as with the first there are difficulties. There is the assumption that in as heterogeneous a society as the United States, there is a body of
values and norms which are acceptable and accepted
throughout the society regardless of social class, ethnicity, religion, race, or region. On one level this assumption may be correct as there is little doubt but that murder and incest are undesirable forms of behavior. But
when one begins to analyze such behavior as the use of
alcohol, tobacco, drugs, or sexually explicit material,
there is little credence in maintaining that all members of the society agree on how such behavior is to be
evaluated.
It is, however, often the case that one finds that a
small group of highly organized individuals succeed
in having their position become the dominant com~
munity stand through the legislation of law. Howard
Becker refers to those who seek to legislate moral behavior according to a particular code as "moral entrepreneurs." In short, some groups "create" deviant behavior by having the power to establish certain behavior
as outside the parameters of "acceptable" behavior, thus
labelling it as "criminal." The prohibitionist serves as
an excellent representative of this type. Out of a moral
fervor to "save" people from immoral and irrational
drinking, there was instituted a law prohibiting all persons from drinking. As Joseph Gusfield summarized it
in his study of the prohibition movement (1967, p . 175),
The Cresset
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"The fact of affirmation through acts of law and government express the public worth of one set of norms, of
one subculture vis-a-vis those of others."

A Concluding Note on Forbidden Fruits
In September of 1970, the Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography submitted its final report to President Nixon. One of the most widely discussed (and
denounced) recommendations from the Commission
was to lift all restrictions on the purchase of sexually
explicit material by adults. This along with the other
recommendations of the Commission were immediately
rejected by President Nixon during the political campaign of the Fall of 1970.
By recommending the repeal of restrictions for adults,
the Commission essentially went against the third proposition above which is congruent to the two perspectives on the necessity for legislative action to curb individual behavior. Both positions hold that the use of
law as a repressive measure will be effective in thwarting the use of explicit material. With the sanction of
law as a formal codification of societal mores, there will
be a strong inhibiting factor restraining persons from
using the material. Any measure less than law, informal
social controls, for example, are held to be ineffective.
The corollary to this position is that the greater the
penality for both use and distribution of such material,
the less one will find the material present in the society.
(Obviously, much the same philosophy has guided the
state and federal legislation on marijuana and other
drugs in recent years.)
If the threat of sanctions are to be useful in deterring
the use of sexually explicit material, there would have
to be some "rational" reasons for its existence. Thus,
to justify legislation against such material, there are
usually offered the reason that the material has negative and "anti-social" effects on individuals and that
it is corrupting to social morals. Law is possible in a
democracy only when those who submit to that law believe it to be legitimate and possessing sanctioned authority. When that law is perceived to lack legitimacy
and "rationality" and fails to stand the test of personal
experience, then that law will lose its desired effect to
guide and curb behavior.
With sexual material, there appears to have been a
serious erosion of support for restrictive legislation
against such material not only because of concern with
freedom to read and see what one desires, but also because in the test of individual experience there is no
manifestation of harm. In fact, in the national survey
conducted by the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, a number of positive reasons where given as to
why those who responded indicated they used sexually
explicit material. Some indicated that they learned
sex information, others stated it provided them with
entertainment, and still others said it increased the
sexual satisfaction of their marriage.
This brief survey has looked at several of the major
November,.J.971
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premises of those who advocate the necessity of creating law to restrict the use of sexually explicit material
for adults in order to prevent moral decay on the part
of the citizenry. It should be evident that the use of
coercion to enforce virtue is not without its pitfalls.
When law becomes a vehicle to enforce a particular moral philosophy, there is the continual danger of morality becoming fanaticism. When a single definition of
~hat is correct, proper, and moral becomes ascendant,
those who do not hold such views are subject to being
labelled "deviant," "non-conformist," and "criminal."
By so doing there is an assumption of those doing the
labelling that they are thus deterring others from engaging in the undesired behavior and that the labelled
will refrain from such behavior in the future . In this
manner the dominant mores and values of the group in
a position of power to transform their values into law
will be maintained.
Yet definitions of reality are always tenuous and
value systems are in a continual state of flux. Thus, an
irony of exclusively relying on law to ensure virtue is
that as people's value systems change, the legitimacy of
·morality in the guise of law becomes weakened and
there is a willingness to explore the taboo. The forbidden may become more enticing and law then inadvertently reinforces that which it was designed to eradicate. Such I suspect will be the case with sexually explicit material in the United States, at least until that
time when this society is willing to more clearly delineate the distinctions between personal morality and
societal issues.

FOOTNOTES
1.

Following the Commlulon on Obocenlty and Pornography, the term "oexually explicit material " will be uoed throughout the remainder of thlo article In lieu of such terms as " pornography," " pornographic, " " obscene,"
" obscenity, " and "erotica ." As the Commlulon suggest&, these latter terma
have lost any precision of meaning and often represent no more than subl•ctlve disapproval of certain materials .

2.

Skolnick (1968 , p. 617-618) hao pootulated at leaot live different pootureo
that one may take on the Issue of morality enforcement through the use of

law : absolute moralist, conservative moralist, pragmatic moral pluralist ,
pragmatic amoral pluralist, and condoner.
3.

This position was clearly articulated by Prealdent Nixon In hla statement
rejecting the flndlnga and recommendatlona of the Commlulon on Obacenlty
and Pornography. He noted , " Pornography can corrupt a society and a clvl·
llzatlon . The people 's elected rep.resentatlves hove the right and obligation
to prevent that corruption ."
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On Becoming a Professor
When you are also female, married, and sincerely interested in your academic career

By MILDRED MORTON KONAN
Assistant Professor of Sociology
Augustana College
Rock Island, Illinois

So you are fresh out of university, Ph.D. in hand,
knocking on the doors of academia. You may be lucky
enough to be in one of those fields where demand exceeds supply. The rest should be relatively easy - unless, of course, you also happen to be female, married
and sincerely interested in your academic career.
Graduate schools don't prepare you in any way for
the unique quality of female job interviews unless you
learned in the oral examinations to reply confidently
to questions which were impossible to answer. The job
interviewers, however, are interested in less abstract,
more mundane topics, such as: "When are you planning
to start a family?" It is one of those questions like:
"When did you stop beating your spouse?" No matter
how you answer it, you disqualify yourself. If you reply:
"None of your business," the interviewer becomes suspicious at best. If you say: "I don't know -never thought
much about it," he thinks you are either answering dishonestly or else there is probably something seriously
abnormal about you. If you reply: "I don't plan to have
children," then he knows you are abnormal. "What's
wrong with you? Are you sterile? Or your husband,
maybe? Poor dear - so that's why you have a career!"
Alternatively you might answer that you do have an
interest in having children at some point in the future.
This reply is also fraught with risk. The interviewer is
likely to decide that you do not have any long term interest in work. He assumes retirement will (and should)
accompany parenthood (in the case of women). A man
is presumed capable of handling both family and job
responsibilities; a woman is not. A physiological change
in a woman's womb is expected to have long lasting
effects on her mental capabilities and motivations. Most
people love children, but what nonsense it is to assume
that housework and babysitting will be totally satisfying to anyone who has just completed eight or more
years of university study.
Job interviewers will also show considerable interest
in your husband. What does he do? In American society
a woman's status and social class are determined by her
husband's occupation. No exceptions are made for the
professional woman. When you are invited to speak,
your introduction or the press release announcing what
you have done or will do is likely to make a special
point of mentioning your husband and what he does.
You are defined in terms of your husband rather than
as an individual in your own right.
But beware - interviewers are interested in your
husband's occupation for another reason. They want to
estimate how much he will earn (and therefore how
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little you can be paid). The two income family is resented and both husband and wife may suffer financially
on that account. Never mind the additional costs imposed by the progressive income tax, dual transportation, professional expenses, domestic help, and so forth.
In the case of the two income family there is a feeling
(very often translated into dollars and cents) that your
salaries should be based on need (as assessed by your
employers). This assessment is a haphazard and arbitrary one; it is not based on total information. Employers never ask about inherited wealth or how much money you borrowed to get through school.
Your husband's work is also presumed to be an indicator of your mobility. Here again logic does not seem
to apply. It is true that sometimes men get transferred
and their wives go with them. It is also true that men
move because their wives have poor job opportunities,
or don't like the climate, or wish to be closer to families or relatives. In young equalitarian families where
satisfying work is important to both husband and wife,
a move may be initiated because one or the other or
both find ~heir work situation dissatisfying for some
reason. It is not always the case that wives go where
husbands want to go. Although less generally recognized, husbands frequently move where wives want to
be.

Pregnant Ideas at Alma Mater
If and when you do manage to get inside the doors
of academia, sexism will be there ahead of you. Most
academic positions are filled by qualified persons who
happen to be men. Your position, however, is being
filled by a woman who happens to be qualified. Note
the emphasis on woman. Your femaleness will be a more
important determinant of your social relationships than
any other fact about you.
Initially, at least, many persons may refuse to believe
or recognize your professional status. Students and
book salesmen who wander into your office will ask if
you are the secretary. Adminstrators, other professors
or their wives may ignore your Ph.D. in introductions
and will exhibit great difficulty comprehending the
fact that you (and not your husband) are the professor.
The individual instances may be relatively insignificant but the cumulative message comes through loud
and clear and often. Your status is being questioned
for no other reason than because you are female.
In day-to-day activities similar sex-related distinctions will be made. A man who stands up for himself
is praised for his ambition. A woman who makes the
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same gestures is aggressive. When a man states his opinion, nobody says: "He just thinks that way because he
is a man." But when a woman says what she thinks, the
response is: "She just thinks that way because she is a
woman." This double standard is most annoying in intellectual work. Your opinion is seldom evaluated on
the basis of your competence or its merit; your sex is
always brought into it.
An administrator may tell you he would like you to
be on a certain committee because you are a woman.
(He doesn't mention your good ideas or qualifications.)
A male student may complain that your course is biased
because you are a female. (Male bias of course does not
exist!) You hear other professors comment that you look
too young and attractive to make a contribution to the
college. (What they mean is that you don't fit the negative stereotype reserved for career women.)
Your professorial colleagues will continue to express
concern regarding the possibility of pregnancy. Pregnancy, you will discover, is regarded as a debilitating
illness rather than as a normal, albeit infrequent, occurrence. No similar concerns are expressed for the
health of male faculty members who might be susceptible to heart attacks and hernias although these illnesses would more likely occur suddenly and would
thus be more disruptive of planned routines than a pregnancy.
In addition, you are likely to be excluded from those
informal channels of communication (dominated by
males) which are so important for receiving grants and
collaborating in research. (Male colleagues may just
assume you wouldn't be interested or lhey may feel uncomfortable about the prospect of working with a woman on an equal basis.) The net effect of this is that you
are relatively isolated, forced to work alone without
the benefits of team work with colleagues.
Not all discrimination is practiced consciously on an
individual basis. You will find that some academic policies which have no apparent sex bias in fact work to
the detriment of women. Part-time positions with rank
are available to men and women who wish to combine
teaching with research or teaching with administrative
responsibilities. But when women with family responsibilities teach part-time they become "lecturers" or
"part-time instructors," with no opportunity for promotion on the tenure ladder. Since men are not expected to raise families or be helpmates to their spouses in
the same sense that women are, their careers are seldom
restricted by this policy. For women it is a discouraging
impediment.
In addition to all of this, you work under the tension
of knowing that whatever you say or do may be held
against all those women who come afteryou. (All men
know that all women are, or at least should be, basically alike. You thus have no individuality.)
So you see, you really don't have it made after all.
Getting this far required far more stamina than required
of the average male. Men are expected to achieve; they
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receive support and encouragement. But women's goals
are supposed to be limited to husband and family. Women who pursue careers are not supposed to have families too. That is, men are to have careers; women are to
have either careers or families, not both. As a result of
this cultural belief you did not receive consistent support and encouragement.

Conceiving Alternatives to Maternity
You were constantly warned by parents, teachers and
friends that you wouldn't pursue your aspirations - not
because you lacked ability or competence, but because
of your femaleness. You are still being forced to justify
what you are doing. This is not only annoying; it is
boring to have to fight the same battles as a fully qualified professional among other supposedly intelligent
open-minded individuals. It is tempting to turn off and
isolate yourself to minimize contact with male chauvinists and sexism or even to stay home and have babies
as everybody has always expected you would do.
Both courses of action would be only temporary palliatives for they are short-lived personal solutions to
a dilemma which is social in nature and deeply rooted
in our cultural traditions. It is not individual successoriented women who are the problem. The problem
originates in a social system in which the biological fact
of being female is a more important determinant of
status and opportunity than the achieved characteristics of education and experience. It is still a biological
fact that women have the babies, but childrearing is no
longer a fulltime lifetime occupation. Now that we recognize the relationship between over-population and
our ecological crisis, we must endeavour to provide
women with meaningful satisfying alternatives to prolonged maternity. We must realize that our social attitudes towards women's roles and women's place are
antiques in a modern world.
As educators we have a unique opportunity to expose the facts about sexism. Perhaps universities and
colleges, open as they usually are to new ideas, provide
the most fertile ground for raising consciousness. We
can work for courses in female studies to help students
see the roles of women in historical and sociological
perspective. We can do research which will expose the
myths about women (imd men). We can work to end
discriminatory practices which keep women faculty
members in lower ranks and at lower salary levels than
their male counterparts of equal qualifications. Women who are teaching half-time, for example, could be
given half-year credit towards tenure.
None of these changes will be made without effort.
Only by persistent exertion can we ever hope to end
this discrimination against one-half of the human race.
Perhaps by continuing to expose sexism, we can eventually move toward "human liberation" in which neither
men nor women will be suppressed by role stereotypes.
Then the task of becoming a female professor should
be quite different that it is in 1971.
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From the Chapel

Thanksgiving -

Anyone Can Play

By HAROLD REMUS

A••i•t••t P••tor, Luther•• Church of the M•••leh
Prl11~to11, N- Jer•ey

Holidays are a lot like games. Games have certain
rules to follow Ready or not, you shall be caught.
Three strikes and you 're out.
Go straight to jail. Do not pass Go.
Do not collect $200.

There are special times too Innings, quarters, frames, sets, and "time out. "

And games have special places Checker board squares, race tracks,
baseball diamonds, squash courts.

Nor are games lacking in rituals Lofting balloons at the football stadium,
eating hot dogs at the baseball park,
yelling at the umpire, and
stretching after the seventh inning.

How do we play our Thanksgiving game? With a
turkey, cranberries, sweet potatoes, and pumpkin pie.
Host and hostess depart from those rules at the risk of
disappointing, if not confusing their guests. As for special places, the kitchen is out of bounds for certain
players, and the dining table is taboo to all players until
sacred words are pronounced. There are special times
set aside to shop for the turkey, thaw it, stuff it, carve
it, and eat it . .Jn the old days, if we believe the cartoons,
the big ritual was picking out the turkey and chopping
off its head. Today the rituals have to do with department store parades in the morning and gladiatorial contests in the afternoon.
There is one more thing common to both games and
holidays: they aren't really "necessary." A gambler may
earn a living by gaming, but most of us don't play chess
or poker or baseball or hopscotch because it brings in
meat and potatoes, turkey and dressing, the money for
the tax collector, or good grades. Fun and games are
something "extra." And so is a Thanksgiving holiday.
No one compels us to buy that big bird and roast it, and
friends and strangers invited to our table are not compelled to come.
The interesting - and perhaps surprising - thing
is that the same was true of the first Thanksgiving on
these shores. Surprising, because if there ever were a
driven bunch of men and women, we think, it was those
Plymouth Pilgrims - constantly preaching, praying,
singing Psalms, and reading the Bible. The first winter
half of them died, and the rest almost did.
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But when the second winter was nearly upon them,
and they had managed to get a little food together, and
a ship arrived with more, they invited the Indians for
dinner - and for three days they feasted on wild turkey, venison, and good part of the food they should
have saved for the coming winter. That feasting was not
really necessary. What kind of game were they playing
anyway? They were playing Thanksgiving.
Let one of those Pilgrims speak for himself:
What could now sustaine them rin the wilderness I
but the Spirite of God and His grace? May not and
ought not the children of these fathers rightly say:
"Our fathers were Englishmen who came over this
great ocean, and were ready to perish in this wilderness; buttheycriedunto the Lord, and He heard
their voice, and looked on their adversities. Let
them therefore praise the Lord, because He is good,
and His mercies endure for ever. "
And that is what they did - they stopped their daily
round of work, took "time out," and gave thanks. Strange
that the Pilgrims, supposedly so dour, could and would
celebrate in that stern wilderness.
What the Pilgrims did, others had done before them.
When the Israelite was harvesting his crops, he took
some of the first fruits, put them in a basket, presented
himself to the priest, and handed him the basket. Then
he recited how the Lord had once brought his fathers
out of slavery in Egypt and given them this land where
he could plant crops and harvest the fruit.
And behold, now I bring the first of the fruit of the
ground, which thou, 0 Lord, hast given me.
Notice how once again this whole act of thanksgiving is
like a game with certain rules to follow, certain moves
to make, and a certain time and place to make them.
There is a whole category of Psalms in which the person gives thanks - because he has been freed from prison, or made well, or sav.ed from shipwreck. And he too
takes time out to make certain moves. He comes up to
the temple and stretches out on his face in front of it,
while his friends and relatives gather around him. Then
taking a cup in his hand, he sings a song:
I will lift up the cup of salvation and invoke the
name of the Lord, fulfilling my vows to the Lord
before all his people.
Next, he turns to the bystanders and tells all that the
Lord has done for him. Thank the Lord with me!, he
urges. Then comes the sacrifice with all joining in the
thanksgiving meal.
Thanksgiving worship in our churches today is like
a game too, where we deliberately take time out and in a
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particular place observe certain rules about singing,
standing, kneeling, and saying. But is there really
thanksgiving in our taking time out? Not all games are
of that unconstrained and "unnecessary" kind that
makes them play. There are some games so badly played
and so frenetic that they only serve to make Jack duller.
Thanksgiving can be that way too. One observes all the
hallowed rules and rituals in the prescribed times and
places, but ends up eating husks, far from the father's
house. One has the forms without their life and substance.
What is the vital spring that may make Thanksgiving
thanksgiving? Whether one thinks of the psalmist with
his friends and relatives gathered with him before the
temple, or the Israelite farmer bringing some of his
produce to the priest, or the Pilgrims celebrating with
the Indians in the wilds of Massachusetts, one is struck
with what is common in their giving of thanks.
Weren't they all affirming that their lives were not
simply grounded and rooted in themselves? After all,
half the Pilgrims had died the winter before. And the
Israelites weren't such famous warriors that the Canaanites rolled over and played dead when they saw them

coming. Psalmists and Pilgrims and other thanksgivers
had received something unexpected and "unnecessary"
- an old word for that is "grace."
The person who receives grace is not in a position to
take credit for everything he counts good in his life.
Grace asks a person to acknowledge that the basis and
ground of his life is not simply his own self and his
achievements. If we don't acknowledge that, our
Thanksgiving game is likely to be fevered and anxious,
or drab and empty, or melancholy and joyless. And the
work we take up on the day after is apt to be the same.
Where do we see that grace, and how do we respond
to it? We see it clearly in the Gospel's portrait of Jesus
Christ, who on the night before his death gave thanks
and ate a thanksgiving meal with his friends. We have
the opportunity to respond to that grace afresh at the
beginning of a new church year, because Advent is a
time of expectation and waiting, and then receiving a
gift - unexpected, "unnecessary" - for which the gracious response is thanksgiving-.
It is truly meet, right, and salutary that we should
at all times and in all places, give thanks . . ..

The Mass Media

Intermission

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------By RICHARD LEE
It was one of my "R & R" days.

A day when I trek to Chicago to take in some "R"
films which will not likely come to the lone movie house
in my little Indiana hometown. Or, if they at last arrive , they are sometimes so badly cut and spliced that
they are sullied.
On this day I had seen M cCabe and Mrs. Miller,
Carnal Knowledge, and Drive, He Said and was on
route to Panic in Ne edle Park. Between the third and
fourth film I needed an intermission of Bromo-Seltzer
and a quiet bar to gather my notes before all the films
blurred in my brain . It was then I was set upon by a
Jesus Freak .
It, I think , was still a young girl, dressed in a streetsweeping black cape and hood, looking like a splice between a penguin and a postulant. If I am lucky, I thought,
I shall get by with only a missionary tract and her blessing, and I quickened my step.
No such luck. She would have a word with me. I made
one of those flash judgments walks in the city require,
fell back upon my evangelical habits, and ruled that
Christian charity required I suffer her testimony. The
divine patience for us all , I quickly concluded, required
my patience not only with the worldly but also with the
other-worldy.
Let it be enough here to say she had gone through
all the changes - pills up and pills down, a stint of
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hopeful exhibitionism as a go-go dancer, casual sex,
alcohol, Tarot, and several self-preoccupied psychotherapies - and was now delivered. "My Lord," she
whispered sepulchrally, "has immortalized me!" Let
it also be enough here to say that she supported her
doubtful claim with testimonies to experiences the older
dogmaticians called "enthusiasm" and the newer ones
call "ego-tripping."
What I was thinking was "Not everyone who cries
Lord, Lord enters the Kingdom," and yet this was not
the time to dispute her doctrinal chastity. There is a
time to midwife faith and there is a time to let people
heal the best they can on their newest idols. Besides,
like most missionaries "of their own experiences, she
wasn't a mite open to a word anyone else might have to
say.
Except, when I finally made my break to the bar,
pleading my headache, she looked down at the curb
and said: "Please mister, am I all right? I don't want
to die . I looked back at her, standing pitiably in the
penumbra of the ghastly mercury vapor lights. "None
of us do," I began carefully, calculating what she could
bear. "Jesus didn't eithPr. He would know how you
feel. And God knows both how he felt and you feel. You
are going to be all right."
I hope.
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In the bar I deciphered my notes written, alas, in ballpoint on the buttered bottoms of my popcom boxes.
Here they are:
McCabe and Mrs. Miller... With the exception of Leonard Cohen's
songs on the sound track, this is excellent, relentless naturalism. . .
Indeed, so naturalistic I cannot always hear what is being said. . .Nor
clearly see!. .. Yet, the soft lens and graining of the film is right.
The director, Robert Altman, happily seems to be over his Fellini period of Last Supper scenes (M•A•s•H) and circus parades (Brewster
McCloud) . . .A 100"/o American film, his least arty and finest film to
date . .. Warren Beatty (I hate to admit) is remarkably good as McCabe,
if still lingering overlong in his stupidstud casting of Bonnie and Clyde
. . . If the last dozen years of "adult westerns" lead us to McCabe, they
were well worth it. .. The American west, we are morally reminded,
was more room for death as much as a rebirth . . .
Carnal Knowledge .. .Mike Nichols redeems his reputation as a director. .. This is a.recovery from Catch-2 2. if short of Who's Afraid of
Virginia Woolf?. . Jules Peiffer's screenplay requires too much talk
(as his cartoons require too many words) and the film bogs down from
one talky analysis of the action to another. .. Yet the Nichols' touch
- getting finely tuned performances from his actors (even Ann-Margaret - and, of course, Jack Nicholson) and long, lingering camera
shots on them at the expense of any background - works a wonder. .
He has made the banality and boredom of casual sex interesting enough
to work a moral judgment upon it, and he has the best homily going
on the question "Is it better to love or be loved?" for anyone who needs
it. .. This is not to say that the author and director couldn't use a lesson in love themselves. . . They are artful, but unforgiving, toward
their characters, especially their loveless hero, a male chauvinist sacrifice. . . The film would be unbearably brutal for those who do not
recognize satire when they see it. . . Perhaps they would be spared by
their inability to identify with the victim . .. Carnal Knowledge could
therefore be the watershed of current American films . . .It is so painfully sharp in the little it says, it could drive filmgoers toward new
films which try to tell a fuller truth about human beings . .. We shall
see if we can get those films. or simply get a reaction of sentimentality.
Drive, He Said .. .Did the same company which made Easy Rider
and Five Easy Pieces make thee?!. . . Drive, He Said?. . . Drivel, I Say!
. . .Pretentious, trendy, adolescent decadence . . Jack Nicholson should
stick to his last, acting not directing. . . Happily I can hope this will
die downtown and be sent over the neighborhood theatres and straight
to the drive-ins . . . Meanwhile, I cannot say too little for it. ..

As I left the bar to Panic in Needle Park, I was looking out for the Jesus Freak. She was now gone, very possibly picked up by some male predator. She was desperate for any assurance, and she was likely to get it.
In her own way, I thought, she was also a mediation
of mass culture in America. Jesus Freaking is more of

the old manipulable transcendence which Americans
love - and the media mythologize - from Madison
Avenue to old Hashbury. The language is the same old
hip, hype hope. The "trip," the "high," the "Jesus NOW"
nostalgia. The psychedelic "second coming," the flower
"children of God" into the ultimate light show. Justification by groove.
But if the language is the same in Jesus Freaking,
the stakes are higher and the crashes more devastating.
It is one thing to come down from Buicks as "Something
to Believe In" or from the grass which is "The Greening
of America" on the other side. It is relatively easy to
put one's idolatry of the finite into the Home for Failed
Gods when one wises up.
But to come down from an idolatry of Jesus is another
thing. Once one has used Jesus Ersatz for one's own
ends, it is hard indeed for the symbol of Jesus Christ
to do its redeeming, especially of one's crashing. The
symbol seems broken, the Spirit spent, and God is dead.
I tried to imagine the Jesus Freak's desolation when her
emptiness attacks her again and she takes it for God. It
was too terrible to contemplate. Better to go to Panic
in Needle Park.
As I bought my next ticket and scanned the reviews
on the marquee, I was thinking that Christians should
be giving more bad reviews to Jesus Freaking than they
are doing. There is, of course, much in this fad which
lies endurably close to the heart of much institutional
religion in America, especially pietism, fundamentalism, and other graspings after absolutes short of Christian faith. It is not, however, the mission of Christians
to take up the manipulable transcendences of the world
(especially those the worldly-wise have already rightly
rejected) and call them faith. Nor can every renascence
of religiousness - from the Meditations of the Mahareshi to the Messiah is the Message - be cleansed and
taken up into Christian faith.
As the house lights dimmed for the fourth time that
day, I added to my notes:
Jesus Freaking. . . Rated X. . .No one who has not contemplated the
cross will be admitted. . .

The Desire of Sister Amado
By GEORGE GOTT

On a certain occasion
we were discussing things
of a chrystalline and gentle nature,
I recall what you said:
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"As forme
I should like to become
a great piece of topaz
And to have the sunshine
to strike me on all sides
pass entirely through me
and to leave me an object
of beauty."

So you spoke of your wishes
as we sat in the darkness:
Now I am equally vain,
I desire nothing more
than to be the sun that shines
and strikes in diaphanous blows
on the walls of that topaz.
The Cresset

Urban Affairs

Bossing the Cities
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- ByJOHNKRETZMANN

The Big Game in Chicago for the past sixteen years
has involved spectators not with the Cubs, or the White
Sox, or even the Bears, but with that most amazing
35,000-man team, the Democratic Machine. At the helm
of this powerhouse is, of course, Boss Richard J. Daley,
the ultimate pragmatist.
To casual fans, fascination with Daley may stem
from purely surface phenomena - his beet-red Buddha-like appearance , his penchant for emotional explosions, his reliance on Casey Stengelisms in place of
normal English. But the real Daley aficionado recognizes that, despite these occasional behavioral quirks,
hizzoner knows his business. The name of the game is
power brokerage, tit for tat, and Daley practically invented the rules.
Certainly part of Daley's political longevity - he
won an unprecedented fifth term last spring - can be
explained by a combination of luck, persistence and an
ability to keep the party organization running smoothly.
Mike Royko details these factors in his recent best seller, Boss. Royko sees Daley as the typical party hack,
unspectacularly but diligently clawing h is way up the
machine ladder, avoiding trouble , waiting for breaks .
The breaks come as rivals either die or are chewed up
by scandal. By 1953, Daley has assumed his priority job
as chairman of the Cook County Democratic Party organization, and two years later he assumed his secondary post, the mayoralty of Chicago.
Daley owes his illustrious career to the Democratic
machine. In return, he has built up the organization
to the point of almost total electoral invincibility. How
the machine wins elections at all levels and how the
party governs are two issues which are inextricably
tangled. In other words, nothing the party - and Daley - does between elections is done without considering its effect on the next round of elections. This rather
single-minded devotion to winning elections and building power might be interpreted as a symptom of greed
or venality, but such an interpretation would miss the
mark. Rather it is simply the way the game is still played: nobody gets something for nothing.
Daley's gut-level understanding of this fundamental
truth is his single most important asset, and the one
attribute which has kept him at the top of the political
heap in Chicago for almost two decades. He is, for example, the one big-city Democratic mayor who can
November, 1971

count on the continuing and enthusiastic support of the
Big Business community for his every project. Even
die-hard Republicans like Nixon appointee David
Kennedy show up at the top of the lists of Daley support groups. The approval of big business, naturally
enough, did not come cheap. The price included the
rebuilding of the entire downtown business section,
the Loop and environs, much of which was paid for by
the public through various renewal schemes.
The second most important part of the machine coalition, after Big Business, is the traditionally Democratic
bloc made up of the white ethnics. Daley's own people,
these heavily unionized blue collar families have demanded a much lower price for their continuing loyalty. Thousands of patronage jobs, adequate housekeeping services for their neighborhoods, and the maintenance of segregated housing and education have been
enough to keep them pulling for the Daley team.
It is the third and final major cog in the machine ,
Chicago's 1.4 million black voters, which is currently
the most shaky. (Some observers would add a fourth
support group of major proportions, the Crime Syndicate, but its role is, for obvious reasons, fairly difficult
to analyze.) For over thirty years, the price which the
blacks have asked in return for their nearly unanimous
supportofthe machine has been- well, next to nothing.
Congressman William Dawson, the late czar of the South
Side sub-machine, ran things in return for what amounted to crumbs from the master's table; his people inherited
a few wards, most of the jobs in the Post Office, and
the most menial of the patronage slots. In the meantime, they were victimized by almost every program and
policy dreamed up by the machine to benefit its other
I
.
constituent groups.
Needless to say, the bbedience of the blacks is no
longer so blind. Across the entire spectrum of the community, black leaders are upping the price for their
support. From moderates with the backing of the growing middle classes like Jesse Jackson, to militants of
every political stripe with community support, demands
which only a few years ago were unthinkable are being
raised with escalating frequency.
If the Machine can meet the new price - better schools ,
housing, welfare, jobs and medical care - it will survive the seventies. If it can't, its a whole new ball game,
and even the name of the game is up for grabs.
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The Theatre

Forget-Me-Not-Theatre
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------By WALTER SORELL

There are moments in one's life when he leans back
upon memories and looks at the things that have made
him the man he is. If one is open to his whole past, they
may be memories of things sweet and painful. The London stage has lately come up with such nostalgia in
several plays - some plays more memorable than
others, and if memorable at all, then mainly because of
bravura acting.
Two of the plays are structurally too similar for comfort, but different in texture and tone. Peter Nichol's
Forget-Me-Not-Lane moves a character called Frank
back upon his life as if it were a picture album he happens to find to thumb through in the attic of his mind.
He turns the leaves now in his doubtful maturity and
tells us of some people and events in his past: his eccentric father, his strangely reacting mother, his boy
friend, his first love, his homosexual temptations, his
marriage that turned sour on him (or did it go stale?),
and his great nebulous, unfulfilled dreams of wild sexual experience.
Frank stands on stage, recollecting his past, while the
scenes are enacted. Dramaturgically, he is a kind of
master of ceremonies who makes the past happen again.
The play is not particuarly well-structured; the scenes
hang loosely around our disillusioned hero. What
makes the play somehow work are the quickly and acidly drawn portraits and the caricatures of people we are
all familiar with. Moreover, the playwright surprises
us with ludicrous and satirically exaggerated interludes,
some of them really funny ideas which work on us like
cabaret sketches. They all add up to a nice, but "sowhat?" evening in the theatre - but since the play is
done in London the acting is unbelievably superb.
Speaking of old albums, I have never fully understood why people like to look at family photographs and
souvenirs of former years - much less why other people should be bothered to look at them too. But I must
say I am very grateful to John Mortimer for having
made me go with him on A Voyage Round My Fatherif for no other reason than the actor who plays his father is Alec Guinness.
In A Voyage there is another son again narrating his
life around his father. The son is on stage while another
actor plays the son as a little boy, a device which has
always disturbed me somehow. Again there is his mother,
his headmaster, his love, his escapes into various professions until he finally takes his father's place as a barrister. Mortimer's major idea is to explore the father,
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blinded early in life through an accident, as a fatherimage to the son.
I say major idea because Alec Guinness gives us a
meticulous study of what a blind father's gestures and
attitudes may be if he is also a man of superior intellectual qualities. In acting as if his blindness were not
real (no one in the family dares mention anything
faintly hinting at his blindness), Guinness offers an
endless variety of little nuances to his role as a wise
and witty man whose mind puts the seeing world to
shame.
The way in which Guinness walks across the stage
- dropping his biting and, more often than not, enjoyable aphorisms - is a masterpiece of acting. He shows
us the father as the father tries not to show his pain and
despair. One cannot help noticing what a great actor
Guinness is, particularly the very minute he is not on
stage. I am told that A Voyage was tried out without
Guinness and that the actor playing the father, Mark
Digman, was also quite good but more subdued in his
acting of the father's bitterness over his fate. Sir Alec
knows how to sharpen each point and still keep the
laughter on his side.
A Voyage may be quite a good play as memory pieces
go; I'm not certain. Often superior acting can make you
think less of a play than it may deserve. But superior
acting can also make one accept a timeworn idea and
bear with a play which is almost a cliche. This is the
case in Alan Bates' performance of the title role in Simon Gray's Rutley. Harold Pinter directs the play and
attempts to show us the total disintegration of a man in
one day of his life, telescoped in two long acts.

The setting is a study in a College of London University, and there seems to be enough drama there for
several plays. Certainly the characters are all unpleasant and/or pitiable enough for it. The struggles between the hero's homosexual desires in a heterosexual
world were all powerfully delineated by Bates and punctuated with those frightening pauses which have become the unmistakable Pintertouch. But the life that
is revealed and which has come to naught is not revealing enough of life. Or have I seen too many plays with
the same theme?
I am assured by many knowledgeable theatregoers
that Rutley is a fine play. That it did not impress me in
spite of Alan Bates and a cast of fine actors may have
been my fault. It just wasn't my cup of British tea.
The Cresset

Music

Letters on Opera
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - By WILLIAM F. EIFAIG, JR.

The debate has ceased, but the issue remains unsettled. The combatants were Englishmen of various
addresses. The field of contest was in London on the
letters page of the Times.
The English, it seems, take their letters-to-the-editor
seriously. The letters page in their papers is a forum in
which freemen have their say and the field for the full
exercise of their freedom to speak out. There are similar
forums in the papers of other countries, but the letters
pages in English papers are more entertaining and provide more good thought than most. The visitor who fails
to read the English letters page misses an essential part
of the English character.

differentiate concert performances from theatrical performances .
The debate has rarely called forth arguments as complete and ingenious as these. The debate , however, has
been held before.
Since its invention at the beginning of the 17th century opera has been a divisive art. Its inventors were
consciously radical. The importation of opera into a
country or a court was often as much for political reasons as for artistic. In France after 1650 Italian operas
were banished from polite society by Louis' patent to
the French operas of Lully. And in 18th century France
the native-versus-foreign battle of the operas was waged
again.

The particular debate I refer to was over the merits
of opera sung in translation. The debate was triggered
by an article about the dilemmas faced by an English
opera company. The company is committed to the principle of performing operas in their original languages,
but faces a new problem now that interest in eastern
European music grows. The opera management must
decide if adherence to its principle will either limit its
repertoire or force the additional expense of contracting singers capable of Czech or Polish texts. The author
of the article was so bold as to suggest that an overriding
concern for principle was senseless and that the musical
loss when a libretto is sung in translation is infinitesimal.

Germany saved its vernacular for vuJgar entertainment, and serious opera was usually in the language of
the local court, French or Italian depending upon the
preferences of the local ruler. 17th century English
opera suffered a premature death at the Civil War and
its rebirth in the Restoration was more transplant than
resuscitation. Handel came to London because he
wrote Italian opera better than any composers of the
day and Italian opera was selling well in England. The
gibes against opera in the Spectator and later in 18th
century novels are the ancestors of some of the letters
which recently appeared in the Times.

For two weeks letters of disagreement or approval
appeared daily. Then they appeared less frequently.
Finally they stopped altogether, by which time it was
perhaps apparent that neither side could win the other
over to its point of view.

The English have never surmounted their dilemma: a
preference for foreign music but a demand for theatre
in their own language. France translates without regrets. So does Italy. Germany does both translations
and originals. In England the debate goes on.

The arguments, when reduced to simplest terms ,
were two: Opera in translation does not faithfully represent the intentions of the composer, and the appreciation of the text-music union in an opera requires that
the audience understand the language sung.
There were elaborations upon these basic arguments.
The text is the reason for which the music exists. Even
if sung in a vernacular a text is rarely audible in every
detail. Comic operas have jokes which are lost unless
they are translated. Many serious operas have poor
librettos even in the original! One purist disapproved a
performance in which the Italian text sung was not the
original but a retranslation into Italian of a German
translation of the original Italian! In inventive mind
suggested a screen beside the stage for vernacular subtitles for the original texts being sung. Some tried to
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The mere appearance of so heated a debate in the
letters to a London paper will seem strange to an American reader. Whether or not the English experience
opera more intensely than Americans, they certainly
have more opera to experience. In London three companies present full schedules during the summer, and
two of the companies present operas throughout the
year. In addition to Glyndebourne, Sadler's Wells,
and Covent Garden (The Royal Opera) other opera
companies present shorter seasons or single performances. The fare is less rich elsewhere bu"t more substantial outside London than outside New York in the
United States. The American opera lover is content to
take his opera wherever and however he can find it. The
English debate becomes an academic exercise if waged
in the U.S.
In the debate, wherever waged, the arguments usually
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tell more about the participants than the points at issue.
The opera-goer who insists upon understanding every
word and the singer who argues for textual audibility
as the prime criterion of judgment may be cowards before the demands of textless music. The purist and the
listener offended by Mozart in English may be illiterate.
On the other hand the former may know delights of
detail hidden from others and the latter may be sensitive
to dramas that transcend language. The interested but
non-combatant reader certainly could have drawn any
one or all of these conclusions from the series of letters
in the Times.

That same reader might marvel at the vitality of the
operatic medium. The opera - born in controversy,
nurtured in polemic, an ideal of artistic union rarely
achieved in actual presentation yet touching the human
experience with unique artistic powers - goes on from
age to age. Debate results in reform and reform in rebirth. On this point the Times writers would probably
all agree.
Keep those letters coming, ladies and gentlemen.
When there is no room on editorial pages for concerns
like these, the world will be a poorer place in which to
live.

Books of the Month

Faith and a Higher Reading of Freud
THEOLOGY AFTER FREUD. By Peter
Homans. New York : Bobbs-Merrill, 1970 .

Theology After Freud is a study in the relation of psychology and theology . Its author ,
Peter Homans, is a member of the department
of Religion and Personality in the Divinity
School at the University of Chicago. Homans,
along with his colleague Don Browning (author
of Atonement and Psychotherapy) , are perhaps the most creative and promising young
theologians in this growing field. The above
two books stand out as superior to anything
in the literature since the publication of the
now dated Psychotherapy and the Christian
View of Man by David Roberts .
Let the reader beware. Theology After
Freud is a difficult book. Anyone who does
not have a deep concern for the relation of
psychology and theology , and who is not
familiar with the authors treated in this book
(Freud, R. Niebuhr , Tillich . Norman Brown,
Bakan and Rieff), had better not attempt
this book.
Even those who meet these criteria will
find it rough going. Homans makes no pretensions at being systematic. The logic of his
argument is complex and often difficult to
follow. There is little elaboration and rarely
any supporting data in his analysis. Given
these warnings , I must quickly add that the
struggle required is more than worth the
effort. Not only are there flashes of brilliant
insight, but the basic thrust of the author's
analysis is in a direction that breaks new
ground and will provide material for numerous
studies to follow .
In a sense it is in error to call this a study
in the relation of psychology and theology
since Homans' intent is to provide a hermeneutic that goes beyond the traditional distinctions between theology and psychology
toward a theology of imagination that can
recover the depths of self-understanding
in a world come of age. Thus Homans' study
is to be distinguished from the psychology of
religion ala William James, from pastoral
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psychology ala Seward Hiltner, and also from
analogical studies like that of Don Browning.
Browning treats psychology and theology as
separate disciplines and probes for anologies
or correlations between them.
Homans, however, begins with a treatment
of Protestant theological existentialism, especially Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich ,
and probes for the psychological infrastructure which undergirds this theology . He finds
that infrastructure in Freud and uses it to
demonstrate how Freud's hermeneutic both
explains and contributes to the collapse of
the sense of transcendence on which these
theologies are so dependent. Regardless of
how one evaluates the validity of Homans'
analysis at this point, it represents a much
needed effort at probing for the psychological
bases in theological construction.
It is this reviewer's firm conviction that
there is a psychology implicit in every theology. If one is dissatisfied with Homans'
analysis of that infrastructure, then he ought
to offer another that is more convincing. What
will not do is any kind of Barthian insistence
that theology is a discipline sui generis with
no point of contact with cultural disciplines
like psychology. That is the kind of obscurantism that offers little hope for a way out of
the present crisis of meaning in theology .
Homans does not stop here. His final methodological step is a constructive effort to go beyond Freud and theological existentialsm toward a rediscovery of religious images, a new
appreciation for myth and its potential for a
recovery of transcendence.
One further word needs to be said about
the procedure which Homans uses in this
book before considering its contents. Homans
insists quite rightly that there are many ways
in which Freud can be read , both by psychologists and theologians. There is a mechanistic reading of Freud which dismisses any
contribution that he might make to theological understanding because the deeper anthropological assumptions betray a reductive naturalsim so characteristic.of nineteenth century

science. Albert Outler's Psychotherapy and
the Christian Message is the most celebrated
example of this. Tillich provides a more dynamic reading of Freud, but his method of
correlation limits the use of psychoanalysis
to positing the theological question for which
revelation provides the answer.
Homans argues for what he calls a "third"
of "higher" reading of Freud , which he believes to be the one most consistent with the
deepest strands of Freud's thought. The fundamental motif in Freud's thought can ve
viewed as the iconic motif. "Freud's psychology is fundamentally about images , symbol
and myth , about interpretations that presuppose levels of meaning, about culture
rather that therapy." Homans is admittedly
influenced strongly by Norman Brown , David
Bakan and Philip Rieff, all of whom contribute to such a "higher" reading of Freud.
Chapter five is devoted to an analysis of these
three post-Protestant interpretations of Freud ,
and Homans' constructive thrust toward a
theology of imagination is heavily indebted to
them· as well as the hermeneutics of Paul
Ricoeur.
It is the theological concept of transcendence which gets most attention from Homans,
and I would like to single it out as a means
to illustrate the method he uses . It is not easy
to nail down the meaning of this construct.
It can mean self-transcendence (spirit over
nature); it can mean the spiritual perception
of "God the high and God the holy"; it can
mean novelty and creativity beyond the subject-object split; it can mean the superego.
Homans admits that "the meanings of specific constructs undergo change as the argument
itself progresses," and this is one of the frustrations in reading the book. The meaning
which Homans finally settles on is fortunately
the one most consistent with common theological usage ; it is captured in the metaphor
of distance.
Theological existentialism is build on an
experience of the distance between God and
man. This can be traced back to Luther,
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"whose spirituality lies at the root of the Pr<r
testant Christian's sense of God's transcendence." Luther's anguished conscience shaped
his perception of God as distant and full of
wrath. His experience of forgiveness and the
nearness of God, expressed in the doctrine
of justification by grace, could be related to
the experience of wrath only in the sharpest
dialectic. Luther was deeply conscious of the
alienation between himself and God and it
is this sense of distance that informs the Pr<r
testant preoccupation with the transcendence
of God ; Homans cites Niebuhr and Tillich
as examples of theologians within this tradition. There is still in this tradition what
Ricoeur calls a "primitive naivete" or "immedicacy" to the symbol of transcendence.

In An Age Without Distance
What characterizes our age, however, is a
collapse of transcendence and thus a loss of
distance. How are we to understand this?
The answer lies in an examination of the
psychological infrastructure behind theological existentialism . It is Freud's interpretation of the Oedipal myth and its image of the
angry father which illumines the psychological basis of the doctrine of transcendence.
Homans develops a psychology of distance
which argues for the interrelation between a
sense of distance and a sense of guilt. Psychologically, it is the superego which creates
a sense of distance within the self and between
the self and others. It is the superego which
is the source of man's alienation and which
cuts him off from the springs of his creativity
and his hope for self fulfillment. Psychologically , Homans suggests, the doctrine of transcendence rests on a sense of guilt.
It is true that Freud ushered in an age which
can be characterized by what Rieff calls the
"triumph of the therapeutic" (a secular alternative to the forgiveness of sins), does that
mean that the power of the symbol of transcendence has been premanently broken for
modern man? Homans thinks not, "At this
point, the force of Freud's psychology is not
so much against the doctrine of transcendence as it is against the psychological infrastructure undergirding that doctrine. The Pr<r
testant Christian's experience of his transcend-

ent God presupposes the anguished conscience. What is the fate of this paradigm if
its infrastructure undergoes alteration?"
It is not possible to return to the Protestant
era and the immediacy of the symbol. The
only way open to us is an awareness of what
Ricoeur calls a second immediacy gained in
and through criticism ; it is by interpreting
that the recovery of distance is possible. H<r
mans closes out his study by posing just such
a J{ermeneutical task for theology. It is the
concepts of"nostalgia" and "hope" that emerge
as central in Homans' brief attempt at this
hermeneutical endeavor. It is not possible
here to trace the lines of that endeavor except to say that it is shaped by a reading of
Freud in which Homans claims to have found
impulses "that press the self forward to transcend the first mythological world and to
enter the second." Put yet another way, psychology becomes the medium through which
theology is in touch with its own depths . The
result, Homans argues, is not a "post-Pr<r
testant" or "post-Christian" or even "Christian" point of view, insofar as that is rigorously juxtaposed to a secular one. I read this
book as Homans' prologomenon for a thoroughgoing theology of culture.
One of the heuristic values of this book is
that it raises so many questions in the mind
of the reader, both constructive and critical
ones. The most fundamental critical question has to do with the nature of the theological task. The task is a hermeneutical one,
according to Homans, and the interpretive
tool is psychoanalysis ala the "higher" reading of men like Brown, Bakan and obviously
Homans himself. "What distinguishes the
approaches of Brown and Bakan from that
of Freud is the way in which the theological
imagination permits them to gain distance
from the problem , to see it both as a question and as a means to the solution of that
question - that is, to see it in a wider moral ,
imaginative, and even implicitly ontological
context."
I take this to be a fairly descriptive statement of Homans' "theological" method. The
assumption behind it is that if you probe deeply enough into the human predicament you
will find its solution, that if you explore the

human situation in its widest and deepest
context you will have recovered the transcendent dimension. It is the meaning of revelation that gets lost in all of this. Homans
notes Niebuhr's reference to "the experience
of being comprehended by a principle of comprehension beyond comprehension." It is
precisely that tribute to revelation that is
missing in Homans. There is little evidence
that a transcendent "Other", related to the
self as the Spirit of God is related to the spirit
of man , is active. in shaping the self and its
understanding of itself.
To be more specific, can one sufficiently
explain the Protestant experience of transcendence by means of the psychological
infrastructure of superego and repression?
This is very likely a factor in Luther's anguished conscience, but are all representations of
the high God, as interpreted by Rudolph
Otto and docu mented by the History of Religions, to be explained by this pathological
psychological infrastructure? Would Homans
argue that Israel's experience of God in the
Old Testament (so full of awe and dread)
can be adequately interpreted by means of
the psychological infrastructure of repression? That comes dangerously close to saying
that the psychology of distance , at least in the
Protestant experience, is pathological.
An alternative reading is that there is, in
fact, a high God who reveals himself as such,
and that the proper response is one of awe ,
fear and a sense of distance. I am not persuaded that a psychology of distance can be
exhaustively explained by a sense of guilt.
That's the kind of reductionism that must
be avoided at all cost. Only a deep appreciation and respect for the meaning of revelation
can protect the theologian from that kind of
reductionism.
One last word of commendation for this
excellent book. Homans provides an annotated bibliography which provides the reader
with a careful guide into the literature which
has informed the author's thought in each of
the chapters. Included are all the resources
one would need for a thorough reading pr<r
gram in the field of religion and personality.
THOMAS A. DROEGE

What's Left of the New Left?
A DISRUPTED HISTORY: THE NEW
LEFT AND THE NEW CAPITALISM .
By Greg Calvert and Carol Nieman. New
York: Random House, 1971. 176 pp. $5.95.
Revolutions do not happen simply because
people are exploited. Such has been the
tragic framework of human life for six millenia. Revolutions happen because something new is possible - because the old
forms of human social existence can no
longer contain or give meaning to the new
substance of human potential. .
.The
basis of revolutionary movement is the
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instinct to live - Eros - as against the
instinct to die - Thanatos. Unless the left
can grasp the revolutionary nature of the
basic, rational, life-affirming drives of real
people, it will have failed to understand its
task.
It is a delight to read a book about the New
Left by movement people which is free of selfconscious Marxist-Leninist rhetoric , romantic
eg<rtripping, and those excuses for New Left
failures which are somehow always due to
"establishment repression." A Disrupted History is not only free of revolutionary cant,

but also gives evidence the authors are committed to well-written English prose, intellectual clarity, and consistent rational discussion.
Greg Calvert and Carol Nieman were involved in full-time radical political activity
during the period in which New Left organizations were growing rapidly in number and
influence. Calvert served for a year as National Secretary of SDS and Nieman was
editor of New Left Notes in 1968. Both of the
authors have written extensively for movement publications. They are able to discuss
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movement history with insight, for they were
intimately involved with the New Left from
its beginnings in Port Huron through the
height of its greatest influence (at least on
campuses) to its subsequent disintegration in
1969 into ever growing rigidity and factionalism. Their participation in the movement
gives special pungency to their critique of the
New Left and its current doctrinal imbroglios.
Calvert and Nieman remain, in 1971, committed to the nonrepressive libertarian decentralism characteristic of the early SDS.
experiential style, and their strong critique of
neo-capitalist society is written in the light
of these values. Consequently, there is no
sloganeering; no blanket put-down of "capitalist pigs;" no call to guerrilla warfare in the
streets. The enemy, for the authors , is a social
process which is no longer useful and which
they see as preventing all people from becoming, as they say in the preface, "lovers
in a society of friends ."
This book probably has most to say to those
who have been either actively involved or at
least seriously interested in the New Left and
have despaired at the factionalism and doctrinal rigidity of the last two or three years .
A Disrupted History contains an optimistic,
even visionary, account of the possibilities
open to the Left in the United States, but
at the same time the authors have their feet
planted firmly on the ground of the real, neocapitalist world we live in.
The authors' discussion of the current romanticism surrounding Third World guerrilla warfare movements is an excellent example of their solid reality orientation. They
point out that the primary aspect of guerrilla
warfare involves a psychological dynamic
that grows out of the fact that power in colonial societies is based on the open repressive
military force of the ruling group. Because the
people feel powerless in the face of this oppression, it is up to the guerrilla strategists

to convince them that a guerrilla counterforce is possible. Thus, the power of the guerrilla technique does not flow from the barrel of a gun , but from successfully creating
a community of people who will support and
supply the guerrillas.
This Third World situation is contrasted
with the situation prevailing in the advanced
industrial capitalist societies where political
power rests on the acquiescence of the mass of
people and their identification with the system. Capitalism is seen as ruling by pretending it does not rule at all. largely through the
mechanisms of parliamentary democracy .
The result of this situation. . .. is to produce a society which is largely governed by
internalized mechanisms of control plus the
spectacle of electoral democracy. That is
why the question of building a movement
in an advanced industrial society is very
different from the problems of mounting
a guerrilla offensive in a Third World country .
If Nieman and Calvert reject the Third
World guerrilla warfare model as impossible
in an advanced industrial society, what kind
of ·movement do they affirm? It is clear the
authors have been influenced by the French
Student Movement of the 1960's and especially by Daniel Cohn-Bendit's book, Obsolet"
Communism: The Left Wing Alternative.
Their vision for the new society is a · similar
life-affirming, libertarian, decentralized
socialism that, by definition, cannot be built
on hatred. The authors reject the hard-line
position which argues that the repressive
nature of the enemy necessarily requires a
response in kind.
Most disturbing about the transformation
which seems to occur within the movement
as a result of its reversion to repressive
values is the adoption of a kind of uninaginative despair which narrows vision , relies
increasingly on mechanical slogans, and

develops a paranoid Manichaean world-view
which feeds fear and hatred rather than
building courage and love.
Greg Calvert and Carol Nieman cherish
love, openness, and community. They believe
the good society is measured by the quality
of individual lives and human relationships
and call for a revolution which establishes
these values as primary. A movement built
on hatred cannot create a revolutionary world
built on love. The New Left is called to return
to the roots of community that developed in
the early and middle 60's. In a fascinating
chapter on Lenin the authors discuss what
they feel to be the basic incompatibility of
Lenmism with life-affirming, libertarian
values and with a movement which hopes to
develop in people the self-consciousness and
self-reliance to enable them " . . . .to act as
part of a determined and clear-headed historical force which develops socialism out of
the womb of capitalism ."
A cogent and critical history of the New
Left accounts for only part of A Disrupted
History. Nieman and Calvert devote several
chapters to what they call neo-capitalism and
its contradictions, post-scarcity , and the new
working class. But is is their critique of the
movement with which they were and are intimately involved and their vision for a new
society that is so invigorating and hopeful.
They conclude with the final request of movement comrades :
The New Left must rediscover .... the essential qualities of all radicals: patience and
a sense of humor. Without patience we lose
sight of the larger process of becoming of
which we are a part. Without humor, we
lose sight of the contradictions within ourselves. And , as someone once remarked,
without love, we sound like brass cymbals
and tinkling bells.
JULIANA HEYNE

The Shaping of American Popular Culture
ANTEBELLUM CULTURE. By Carl Bode.
Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press. 1970. $7 .00 cloth ; $2 .45 paper.
Professor Carl Bode of the University of
Maryland has long been one of the most highly regarded students of American cultural
history. His recent book Antebellum Culture
is a reissue with minor corrections of his
The Anatomy of American Popular Culture
1840-1861, first published in 1959 . Although
the term antebellum is often especially associated with the South , the author is not using
the term in this restricted sense. His book
deals with popular culture in all parts of
America during the two decades before the
Civil War.
The book is a fascinating study of the literature. drama. painting, and sculpture which
was popular with the mass of Americans of
this period ; it contains sixteen pages of ill-
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ustrations , including Powers' famous "The
Greek Slave."
Professor Bode regards the two decades
before the Civil War as "a time when our culture first assumed its modern shape" and perceives "four principal complexes of qualities" in that period . The first "complex" has
patriotism at its center, with its chief symbols
being the flag , the American eagle, and the
image of George Washington. The second
complex has aggressiveness at its core, with
its most direct manifestation being the literature of success. The third complex is basically religious and manifests itself in tracts ,
volumes of piety, and in the best-seller status
of the Bible. The fourth complex is a rather
vague one - love; it includes family relationships as well as love between the sexes .
Thus the author gives the reader thematic

guideposts to help· him comprehend and inter-relate a broad range of diverse popular
art. The writing is lucid , the individual chapters well-organized . For example, in his chapter on the popular novel of the 1840's, Professor Bode comments on the great appeal
Scott and Dickens had for Americans of the
time, and then presents in contrast to these
well-known British writers a "lost figure in
the history of American culture," the equally
popular American novelist George Lippard,
whose sensational stories, such as The Quaker
City, created a public furor.
The recent rapid expansion of the market
in the popular arts , as well as the steadily
growing interest in American studies, should
assure many new readers for this well-written
book.
PAUL PHIPPS
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The Prince at War
ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM. By James MacGllegor Burns. New
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich , 1970.
A ruler, Machiavelli advised his prince,
should learn from the beasts of the forest.
He should be "a fox in order to recognize traps
and a lion to frighten off wolves." The ruler
who simply acted like a lion, Machiavelli
warned, was both stupid and ineffectual.
According to James MacGregor Burns, Franklin Roosevelt combined these complementary traits in a way which the author of The
Prince would admire.
In Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox , Burns
portrayed the President during the economic
depression of the 1930's when Roosevelt
dreamed about America's future while tempering his hopes with a recognition of political realities. Throughout the decade , the
President developed plans for recovery and
adjusted them to the demands of pressure
groups. In the process, he produced a crazy
quilt of often contradictory programs , united
only by his own dominating personality .
In Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom ,
Burns continues to develop the theme of
Roosevelt , the realistic dreamer. Like the
New Deal , he argues, Roosevelt's are policies were a combination of idealism and pragmatism, with all the inner contradictions and
necessity for compromise which such a combination implies.
Burns devotes a large section of his narrative to the story of the lend-lease bill, using
the battle over aid to Britain as an illustration of how Roosevelt modified his desires to
fit the realities of power within America. In
1940 , most Americans believed that World
War I had been fought in vain , that munitions makers and anti-democratic European
nations had benefited most from American
entrance into the conflict. They especially
feared that aid to Britain in her struggle
against Germany might draw America into
another "European" war.
Such beliefs were echoed in Congress - especially in the strongly isolationist Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Roosevelt was
convinced , however, that aid to Britain was
a necessity and that delay might prove costly
to the British war effort.
First he attempted to influence American
public opinion. Since most Americans were
anti-German , Roosevelt emphasized the evil
which Hitler represented and the danger which
America faced if the Nazis defeated England.
But the Senate opposition to aid was firm,
and Roosevelt soon realized that such public
speeches, however well-received, would never
persuade the Foreign Relations Committee
of the wisdom of the program. Instead he
launched a characteristic program of attack
followed by delay - designed to confuse the
bill's oponents and allow time for support to
build.
First he persuaded Wendell Willkie, his
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opponent only a few months before, to testify for the bill before the isolationist-dominated committee. Willkie's support of lendlease disar1_11ed many Republicans and made
the proposal seem less a partisan issue. Then
Roosevelt professed an unconcern about the
Senate debate on the measure, confident that
his seeming nonchalance would speed the
act's passage. The strategy worked. Lendlease was approved; American aid to Britain was begun. Once again Roosevelt's combination of boldness and caution had brought
him victory. His success was significant, for
Burns shows clearly that as Roosevelt became
more deeply concerned with foreign affairs
during the first years of his third term , he
used his strategy of persuasion and delay in
diplomacy as well.
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ,
Roosevelt found himself involved in a twofront war, with simultaneous alliances with
Russia and Britain. To a less confident man ,
the task would have seemed monumental,
for all war plans had to be ctH>rdinated with
Stalin and Churchill, two of the most strongwilled foreign leaders. But to Roosevelt the
solution was simple. By charming the leaders
of Russia and Britain into agreement and
postponing all issues which he could not
settle to his satisfaction, he hoped to establish a post-war world order which would favor
American interests and guarantee the political and economic freedoms which he cherished . The skill which had made the New Deal
and lend-lease possbile would now be directed toward creating these new international
arrangements.

Dr. New Deal and Dr. Win the War
The conference throughout the war helped
convince Roosevelt that such an American
diplomatic victory was attainable. Repeatedly, he succeeded either in reconciling his
Allies to American desires or in postponing
final action on important issues. At Casablanca in 1943 , he manuevered Churchill
into agreeing to the U.S. plan for unconditioned surrender at a time when the Prime
Minister was still unwilling to accept it. At
Teheran, later in the same year, he played
the part of the conciliator between Stalin and
Churchill and obtained, he believed , Stalin's
promise to postpone any agreement on Poland 's status until after the 1944 presidential election.
By the end of the war, Burns claims that
Roosevelt was convinced that he could persuade Stalin to compromise on the Polish issue and agree to free elections in eastern
Europe. But at the Yalta conference the President discovered that more than persuasive
charm was needed to move Russia on this
issue, for Stalin insisted that a free Poland
would menace Soviet security.
Unable to change Stalin's mind , Roosevelt

found himself faced with grim facts. Russia
occupied Poland; only a new war could wrest
the nation from Soviet control. The war with
Japan continued, and Roosevelt believed that
Russian aid was essential to defeat the Japanese army in Manchuria. Finally he feared
that persistence on the Polish issue might
anger the Russians and cause them to sabotage the United Nations, Roosevelt's hope for
world order. With these considerations in
mind, Burns claims that Roosevelt had little
choice at Yalta but to accept Stalin's promise
of a "reorganization" of the Polish government, allowing each party to interpret that
word however it wished.
Roosevelt knew that the pact did not solve
serious differences, that its vague language
only delayed confrontation until a later time.
But Roosevelt was convinced that when the
war was ended , he could handle Stalin more
easily , and he saw that the Yalta agreement
as a temporary settiement only. In Burns'
account the pact is not the mindless action of
a sick man or the result of inept negotiation.
Roosevelt was the consummate politician at
Yalta, the perfect Machiavellian fox. He obtained all that he could , considering his weak
bargaining position, and optimistic as always,
he believed that he had postponed a final
settlement until the war with Japan was over.
Thus Burns sees Roosevelt's greatest failure as an ironic result of his previous successes at diplomacy. His ability to conciliate
Stalin at Teheran convinced him that if the
alliance could be held together, he could
win Soviet co-operation through his personal
charm and persuasiveness. No disagreement
was so serious, he believed , that it could not
be talked about, bargained over until compromise resulted.
The confidence that disagreement could
always be talked away, the belief that delay
was preferable to confrontation, the realization that idealism had practical limitations these assumptions helped shape the course
of war-time diplomacy much as they had determined the shape of the New Deal.
Roosevelt himself claimed that little relationship existed between the New Deal and
the war. When the nation's problems changed,
he insisted , "Dr. Win the War" replaced "Dr.
New Del11" as the specialist called upon to
minister to the American body politic. In his
fascinatmg, readable account of the war years ,
Burns rejects such a facile oversimplification.
He is not afraid to assert that the characteristics which made Roosevelt a successful reformer were the same which led America into
the Cold War with Russia. Roosevelt: The
Soldier of Freedom makes clear what previous biographies of Roosevelt have only suggested obliquely: "Dr. New Deal" and "Dr.
Win the War" were one.

RONALD
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On Reading Sociology from a Theological Viewpoint
THE LUTHERAN ETHIC : THE IMPACT
OF RELIGION ON LAYMEN AND
CLERGY. By Lawrence L. Kersten. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970.
309 pp.
If in some careless moment the Lutheran
Church expressed the wish "to see ourselves
as others see us ," its Burnsian prayer has
been answered by this book. The idea of subjecting religion and its institutions to the
scrutiny of the sociological investigator is of
course not new. One need simply recall the
names of such men as Glock, Hadden, and
Lenski, to mention only a few . But Kersten's
study represents a new approach in the comprehensiveness with which he attempts to examine a major denomination in terms of its
own ethic.
By ethic Kersten means to designate not
only formal creedal statements, but also
social attitudes and actual behavior. It stands
for a total ideology, a complete world view.
His understanding of the Lutheran ethic is
strongly influenced by Ernst Troeltsch , who
first used the term in his work The Social
Teaching of Chn'stian Churches (tr. 1931 ).
Hence Lutheranism is represented as based
upon "the religious theory of the purely spiritual nature and inwardness of the Church ,
while all external secular matters are handed
over to reason , to the civil authority ." Law
and grace are individually focused and appropriated, and therefore no collective efforts
toward social reform are considered desirable
or necessary. Quietism and passivity are
Lutheranism's posture in the world, because
secular institutions function as restraints
against human sinfulness. Similarly , the
notion of fixed orders of creation produces
a patriarchal orientation to family life, a distrust of scientific education, and social ~nd
political conservatism.
That such an ethic has had its impact upon
the beliefs, attitudes , and behavior of Lutheran clergymen and laymen alike is the finding
of this book. The results, documented by 161
tables , are quite predictable, with few surprises for anyone whose bone marrow is Lutheran. There is indeed an operative Lutheran
ethic, distinct from the more prominent Calvinist ethos. On the Lutheran spectrum that
ethic is best preserved on the right in the
Wisconsin Synod; stages leftward on the
spectrum are represented by the Missouri
Synod , still right of center, the American
Lutheran Church , left of center, with the
Lutheran Church in America farthest to the
left.
The Lutheran ethic, therefore, is not the
sole impact on Lutheranism ; its rival is what
Kersten chooses to call humanism or modernism . These are not invested with precise positive context, but they are defined rather by
a series of negative indicators: the Bible is
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not the Word of God in the traditional sense,
faith in Christ is not necessary to salvation,
,genuine religion is determined more by correct behavior than by true doctrine. More
liberal beliefs are accompanied by a corrosion
of commitment, as that is measured by such
indices as church attendance, private devotional exercises, and church contributions.
Liberal Lutherns take a more optimistic view
of man with a correspondingly greater emphasis on the freedom of the will; hence also
the value of obedience tends to be replaced by
that attached to thinking for oneself. The
liberal de-emphasis on the world to come in
favor of involvement in this-worldly social
concerns correlates also with a greater vocational identity crisis among liberal clergymen.
The conservative-liberal tension , however ,
is not a static equilibrium of inherently dialectical forces. Kersten offers evidence of a
trend from the conservative to the liberal
position. Except in the Wisconsin Synod,
the older clergymen were found to be more
conservative, the younger more liberal. A
similar scale obtains among the laity . This ,
Kersten thinks , betokens a crisis and may
indicate an impending re-alignment in Lutheranism.

At the Frontier
of Two Different Methods of Inquiry
The results of the study , made in the greater
Detroit area, will readily supply statistical
grist for everybody's ideological mill . The
knee-jerk liberal can now further document
his case, just at the compulsive conservative
has a fresh occasion for his lamentations ,
while the middle of the road can continue to
boast a higher vantage point than either
curb. But the more serious problem lies elsewhere , at the frontier between two different
methods of inquiry , two alternative modes of
perception. For, to judge from Kersten's example , the sociologist's view of the Lutheran
ethic differs so widely from that of the theologian that their interrelationship becomes problematic.
To come directly to the point, what dictates the selection of Ernst Troeltsch as the
measure of the Lutheran ethic? His inadequacy as an interpreter of Luther has long
since been pointed out by men like Th. Harnack , E. Seeberg, and P. Althaus. Such a
selection seems all the more surprising, even
tendentious , in view of highly instructive and
more accurate alternatives. A Werner Elert's
Chn'stian Ethos or a Helmut Thielicke's
Theological Ethics, both self-consciously
Lutheran studies, might have warned against
the notion that "the Lutheran ethic goes beyond a statement of religious creeds and encompasses a total ideology - a complete

weltanschauung or world view," (emphasis
supplied). No statement of the Lutheran
ethic can rest content with a mere description
of the existing values and attitudes of its
adherents , for it is suspended in the tension
between the Law and the Gospel.
That means, in the first place, that a statement which describes what is must in the
Lutheran ethic be balanced by a statement of
what ought to be. For the total ideology too
stands under the indictment of the Law of
God. Lutheranism knows of no safe harbor
against God's universal judgment, no security in an alleged zone beyond the necessity
of forgiveness. Troeltsch's model as employed
by Kersten in his instrument may therefore
not be uncritically adopted by conservatives
nor uncritically rejected by liberals in the
name of some alternative monistic model.
In the second place, Kersten's understanding of the Lutheran ethic does not deal adequately with the reality and power of the
Gospel. Indeed it may be asked whether a
sociological instrument can do so, for the Gospel's appropriate instruments are preaching
and faith. For when Jesus Christ is proclaimed , God is at work effecting His new creation
among those who receive him in faith. The
methodological exclusion of this hidden , eschatological dimension for purposes of sociological analysis only succeeds in disfiguring
what is meant theologically by the Lutheran
ethic. The Lutheran Reformation grew out of
the question : How shall I find a gracious
God? Its ethic is shaped by the perpetual
recurrence of that central human agony , and
by the firm conviction that He reveals Himself to men of faith in the preaching of Jesus
Christ crucified and risen .
Among his conclusions Kersten states that
it has become sociologically meaningless to
speak of the Lutheran point of view. Understandably! It is no surprise that a man who
is bound and gagged can make no significant
comment or movement. Define religion as a
total ideology , remove the built-in critical
norm , and ignore the dynamic for a new
(though hidden) creation, and one is left with
a caticature, a straw man easily disposed of.
It is not as easy for a theologian to dispose
of the sociologist, however. For truth is reflected , however fragmentarily, both in Kersten's data and in his conclusions. It is a truth
of judgment that he voices upon a Lutheran
ethic that has so willingly allowed itself to be
bound and gagged, thus stifling its critical
voice and paralyzing its freedom of movement
in God's new creation. Hence the book should
be read - from a theological point of view.
Which means from the posture of repentance
and new obedience.
WALTER E. KELLER
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The Festival of the Oppressed in the Sexual Wilderness
THE FEMALE EUNUCH. By Germaine
Greer. New York : McGraw-Hill, 1971.
349 pp. $6.95.
The face of the author, all smiles, peeps
mischievously through a full circle of dark
hair in her picture on the dust jacket. She
has reached the age . according to French
lovers, of ultimate glamor. She also has a
PhD from the University of Cambridge and
would tell women explicitly how "to come
to terms with the many psychological techniques of male domination."
The theme of Germaine Greer's The Female Eunuch is just what I've been preaching half my lifetime to anyone who will
listen: women will not gain their freedom
until they first learn to work with and for
other women. Greer offers what many women need: not a Beauvoir catalog of complaints, nor a history of "how we became
enslaved," but insight into male domination
and a thorough discussion of the means to
wage psychological and other forms of resistance.
The meaning of the title is made clear on
page 5, where Miss Greer points out that
the characteristics praised in woman are
"those of the castrate - timidity, languor,
delicacy, and preciosity," and that much of
what it means to be a woman in our society
depends upon the "suppression and deflection" of her energy. This is not a modern
notion. In 1783 Choderlos de Laclos wrote,
"Draw near, woman ... learn how you were
born the companion of man and became his
slave." Like most "slaves," women have also
been the object of loathing and disgust , if not
hatred. On page 10, Miss Greer calls upon
each woman to "know her sisters . . . With
them she can discover cooperation, sympathy,
and love."
She warns that the fear of freedom is strong
in women (p. 11) and frankly admits that her
book is subversive. It is aimed at "open intellectual rebellion." Women must exert their
. intellectual powers, no matter what the cost.
Miss Greer recounts a few male absurdities
to forewarn us of the level of the debate which
needs to be transcended , like the comment of
Robert Briffault in 1931 : "Political and civic
equality of the sexes implies moral equality which means the total collapse of Christian
morality." (p. 99)
Miss Greer comments , "If women understand by emancipation the adoption of the
masculine role , then we are lost indeed."
(p. lOB) She states as her credo: "Womanpower means the self-determination of women, and that means that all the baggage of
paternalistic society will have to be thrown
overboard." She quotes from Rilke's Letters
to a Young Poet ( 1945 ): "The great renewal
of the world will perhaps consist in this, that
man and maid, freed from all false feeling
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and aversion, will seek each other, not as
opposites, but as brother and sister, as neighbors, and will come together as human
beings."
In the chapters on "Altruism" and "Egotism" Miss Greer concludes that much of the
behavior commonly described as "love" is
antisocial. "Too often feminine altruism is disguised egotism ." (p. 152) "Love" is really
taking pride in one's self through one's partner. And the man who looks at "his woman"
as a possession is already ~rrupted in his
own person. Unfortunately, such a view of
"love" is still uppermost in the literature of
the present day . Miss Greer is not talking
about the pulp of confession magazines, but
of "literature" - of Lawrence and Hemingway and Mailer and Genet.
In the chapter titled "The Middle-Class
Myth of Love and Marriage," she reminds us
that "in feudal literature romantic love was
essentially antisocial and adulterous." (p. 196)
The Church was forced to "romanticize marriage to stem the tide of fornication . . . The
wedding became the chief ceremony of middle-class mythology." (p. 213) Miss Greer
swiftly traces the historical changes which
have made the "stem family" obsolete and
points up those aspects of the " nuclear family" which invite wife-swapping (p. 225) and
other male-made contours of the sexual
wilderness.

If Women Leamed to Like Women
The chapter titled " Loathing and Disgust"
is a searching criticism of a society which encourages men to expect to be loved as they
are, but demands that women should continually struggle for superhuman beauty .
Changes in the English vocabularly attest to
the increase of man's revulsions toward woman. The words harlot, bawd, and scold , to
choose a few from a long list, are now feminine gender, but were used of both sexes
until 1700. The basic imagery behind a long
list of words of endearment, such as honey,
sugar, sweetie-pie, is that of food . A woman
is to satisfy m·an's hunger. Philip Wylie caught
the frequency of woman-hatred in the speech
and customs of both men and women in
America, and he actually states that female
suffrage is responsible for political corruption! (p. 265)
The chapter titled " Misery" is summarized
in the sentence, "The majority of women drag
along from day to day in an apathetic twilight ,
hoping that they are doing the right thing,
vaguely ex pecting a reward some day ."
(p. 279 ) Yet happiness, according to Miss
Greer, is a positive achievement , not a reward. She points up the losses of happiness
on both sides of the "battle of the sexes" by
reference to Charles Schultz's "portrait of the
embattled female" in Lucy in the saga of Pea-

nuts. Lucy is a symbol of the miserable destructiveness of womankind, yet Greer adds :
"To complement Lucy's destructiveness we
read the fuller statement of Strindberg's
Dance of Death as well as Ibsen's A Doll's
House and Hedda Gabler."
Greer believes the time is again at hand
for every woman to seek autonomy for herself. (p. 289) The beginning of the second
feminist wave was Betty Friedan 's research
"into the post-war sexual-sell which got American women out of the factories and back into
their homes." (p. 294) Her book led to her
forming NOW (National Organization of
Women). Ti-Grace Atkinson has organized
a more radical group, The Feminists, for research and the making of propaganda (P.· 295)
In 1966, Julia Mitchell published the most
coherent statement of the socialist feminist
position. (p. 296) In the summer of 1968,
women's liberation groups emerged in the
New Left, including delightful , put-on groups
like WITCH (Women's International Terrorist Conspiracy from Hell). (p. 307) There
are many other women's liberation' movements of all shades on the political spectrum
now operating in the United States and in
England. Gloria Steinem remarked that this
"has happened not so much by organization
as contagion."
In her last chapter titled "Revolution," Miss
Greer argues that in sexual relationships "the
emphasis should be taken off male genitality
and replaced upon human sexuality." (p. 316)
"Women should labor to be genuinely disgusted with violence." (p. 317) Women must
also reject their present role as principal consumers in the capitalist state. (p. 322) They
could form household cooperatives, sharing
their labor, and thus liberating each other.
The chief means of liberation is the "replacing of compulsiveness and compulsion by
the pleasure principle .. .It is possible to use
cooking, clothes, cosmetics, and housekeeping for fun ." (p. 324)
"Revolution," says Miss Greer, "is the festival of the oppressed." (p. 328) It ought to
mean the "purposive employment of energy
in a self-chosen enterprise." The book ends
with a question: "What will you do?" (p . 329)
Perhaps the emphasis should be, "What will
you do?" It is a very personal thing, this making of a new world. Germaine Greer has set
the hopes of the future clearly before us and
has given us an historical basis for thought.
There is also wisdom in her exhortation to
women to join together in a movement of
their own. Men have always used the herd
instinct to strengthen their position in the
battle of the sexes and , incidentally, to have
fun. Women should revert also to that primitive urge.
MARY GRAHAM LUND

23

Junius R. Sloan ( 1827-1900 ), SelfPortrait, 1654, 22 x 13-1/ 2", oil on
canvas. Sloan Collection, Valparaiso
University.

Junius R. Sloan, On Winooski River, Vermont, 1676 , 11 x 19", oil on canvas. Sloan Collection , Valparaiso University .

Visual Arts Exhibition: Selections from tlie Sloan Collection
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - By RICHARD H. W. BRAUER

The Sloan Gallery of American Paintings came to
Valparaiso University in 1953 as an endowed gift from
Percy H. Sloan, son of Junius R. Sloan, a midwest American landscape artist of the Hudson River School. New
paintings are purchased with the interest accrued on the
endowment fund .
The most recent addition is Farm by the Sea, Nantucket, 1886, by Eastman Johnson (see cover). Frederick
H. Sweet, retired curator of American painting and
sculpture for the Chicago Art Institute and specialist

in 19th century American art, was a consultant to the
Sloan Committee for this purchase and called it "a major
painting by a major artist."
The University hopes to form a collection representing every major development in American painting.
Not only do art students benefit from studying these
paintings, but the paintings make available to the University and the community experience of beauty and
meaning which enrich their lives and contribute to
their education.

Georgia O'Keeffe, Rust Red Hills, 1930 , 16 x 30 , oil on canvas. Sloan Collection, Valparaiso University.
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Charles Burchfield, North Woods Mood, 1956 , 40 x
33", watercolor on paper. Sloan Collection , Valparaiso University .
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John Sloan, Pile Driver, Evening. 1916, 20 x 24", oil on canvas. Sloan Collection, Valparaiso University.
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Political Affairs

All the News That's Fit to Print
---------------------------------------------------------------------------ByALBERTR.TROST

How many times we have heard the charge, in the
last two years, that the mass media in the United States
are biased!
Vice President Agnew repeated the indictment (which
he personally has turned into a crusade) a few weeks
ago at a police chiefs' convention, at which he accused
the national press of bias in handling the Attica prison
disorders. He charged that the press exaggerated the
activities of revolutionaries and criminals and playeddown the law-abiding behavior of most citizens.
Other recent accusations against the press have been
made by the Secretary of Defense and congressmen
against CBS News for its television program, "The
Selling of the Pentagon," by Mayor Daley and State's
Attorney Hanrahan against Chicago newspapers and
television stations for their handling of the police raid
on the Black Panther Party headquarters, and by many
congressmen, senators, and executive branch spokesman against The New York Times, The Washington
Post and other newspapers for their printing of "The
Pentagon Papers," and their support for Dr. Daniel
Ellsberg.
The charge is basically true. In my view, the bias of
almost all national network television reporters and
commentators, and of the great majority of big city
newspaper reporters and editors, especially those of
the national "prestige press," is in the direction of the
liberal, reformist wing of the Democratic Party. Some
reporters make an attempt to limit the effects of their
personal biases and leave partisan comments to the
editorial page or the editorial commentary section of
the television newscast. These efforts can only be partially successful. Even for the reporter who attempts
objectivity, the sources of information for a story continue to reflect his bias, as does the positioning of facts
in the story. Also, the attention which the story is given
on the television network and its position in the newspaper reflect an editor's preferences.
To say that many of the mass media in the United
States are biased and that their preferences run against
most of the current power-holders is not to condemn
them. In fact, in a modem industrialized, centralizing
polity which has pretensions of being democratic, a
critical posture toward the government is highly laudable. Most definitions of democracy in the American
tradition hold opposition and alternatives to the current
rulers to be desirable.
If one admits, however, that opposition is desirable
in a democracy, the observer of American politics is
struck by the fact that at the level of national politics
there is very little. Certainly the opposition party, the
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Democrats, do not provide it, except in election years.
While the national government is centralized under
the leadership of President Nixon, the Democratic
Party is divided, without a recognizeo spokesman. Certain men in Congress, like Senator William Fulbright,
raise a voice to offer an alternative to present policy,
but it is the voice of only one wing of the opposition
party and lacks legitimacy on matters other than foreign
affairs. Other clear voices of opposition are too localized to be effective as alternatives in national policy.
It is into this vacuum of national opposition that the
mass media step.
A second criticism of the national media which Vice
President Agnew and Governor George Wallace have
especially raised is that the networks and the "prestige
press" do not speak for the common man. Again , if one
focuses on the news sections of the programming and
editing, there is some truth in their claim. It is their
prescription of repudiation and censorship of TV and
the press that must be quarreled with.
The common man in the United States does not have a
specific position on most issues. We must usually be led
to a position. Political leaders, especially public officeholders, are very influential in this leadership. However, again there is a need for alternatives. Editorially,
the mass media can provide them.
There is, however, a danger in the majority-will , or
voice-of-the-people argument. It is probably true that
most elected office-holders do have a legitimate claim
to representing majority opinion. In most cases, it was
a majority that elected them, and many public figures
make a concerted effort to be in step with the majority
opinion reflected in public opinion polls. President
Nixon has come closer than any of the recent presidents
in speaking for the majority ("the busing issue" is a
case in point). However, the definitions of liberal democracy that require the presence of an opposition do
not qualify that opposition by saying it is unnecessary
if the majority rules . The majority is also capable of
being tyrannical and undemocratic.
It is highly likely that a majority of the people who
hear opinions on the press (and through the press) by
public leaders like the Vice President agree with these
leaders. It is also likely that they would agree with Mr.
Agnew that censorship and intimidation of the press is
desirable. For this reason, it is urgent that voices of
opposition be raised, even if only representative of a
minority. It is the voice of an opposition minority that
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects when it says "Congress shall make no law.
abridging the freedom of the press."
The Cresset

Editor-At-Large

By .JOHN STRIETELM EI ER

The President's Education Policies

Some of my best friends are Republicans - a fact
which I no more hold against them than their race, sex ,
creed, color, or national origin. I believe that Republicans can be saved. I even believe that certain Republicans in certain situations can be trusted to govern . But
sometimes I wonder whether there is any continuum between Republican theory and practice ; whether, once a
Republican attains power, there is any discernible difference between the way he uses power and the way the
Democrats use it.
Catch the first Republican you find and ask him what
he believes in and , chances are , it will be "personal
freedom" or "constitutional liberty" or "the dignity of
man" or "limited government" or some such cliche
which, however shopworn it may be by frequent and unthinking use, nevertheless implies a high view of the
individual man or woman as the clearest reflection of
the divine image that we encounter in this world. Republicans believe in individualism. They believe that
laws and governments and the institutions of society
exist for the sake of people and not the other way around.
Republicans distrust bigness, whether in government or
in business or in education. They admire and are willing to support distinctiveness, the enterprise of the
small operator sailing against the wind, rowing against
the current.
This is, as I understand it, the true Republican faith
which, except a man keep it whole and undefiled , assuredly he will never rest in the political bosom of William
McKinley . But alas! political faiths no less than religious faiths have those, sometimes in high places, who
know to do good but do it not. And this is where I finally
get to the point of this month's column: the Nixon administration is certainly permitting, and probably encouraging, the trend toward more and more concentration of control over higher education in the hands of
the state and, with that, the disappearance of private
colleges and universities as viable alternatives to statecontrolled education.
It is doubtful whether this is a deliberate policy. Mr.
Nixon is doing very little for either private or public
education. And this is understandable. Certainly he
owes no political debt to Academe. But he claims to
subscribe to those articles of his party's creed which I
have attempted to outline above. And we are entitled to
expect that Mr. Nixon, in office, would try to implement
these personal and party convictions in the way he and
his underlings deal with the nation's biggest enterprise,
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the education industry. He might be expected to do so
even though, in so doing, he incidentally benefits adversaries whom he has no reason or desire to reward.
But the President has, as a matter of fact, shown little
sympathy with or concern for the difficult position of
the private college. By his policies, if not in so many
words, he has said, "OK, you private Davids, get in there
and mix it up with the state-supported Goliaths. And
may the best man win!" Neutrality of that kind can, in
the long run, be as fatal to the small, distinctive, private college as overt hostility. And one doesn't even
have to talk about the long run. Right now, private
institutions all over the country are in trouble, some
of them in very grave troubles, and there is no relief
in sight. Even with a grievously unbalanced federal
budget, there are very few funds available to higher
education. It apparently doesn't stand very high on the
list of the President's priorities.
More subtly, the present administration is making
things difficult for the private - especially the churchrelated - college and university by setting conditions
for assistance which, in effect, forbid these institutions
to be distinctive. Now no one will deny that if you ask
a man for money he has the right to stipulate the conditions under which he will give it to you. But a Republican administration is, it seems to me, bound by its
own declared convictions to use federal money for,
among other things, the promotion of diversity in higher education. But last year the university at which I
work was advised that it might not conduct its religion
classes in any building built with federal funds, and this
year it was advised that it should include in its catalogue, after the roster of its faculty, the following statement: "Valparaiso University appoints its Faculty without regard to race, sex, creed, color, or national origin"
(emphasis mine). When a Lutheran University can not
take Lutheranism or at least Christianity into account in
the appointment of its faculty the state is anything but
benevolently neutral. It is, in effect, forbidding the
University to depart from the religiously-neutral model
of the state institution, and thus deny its right to survive.
The most charitable interpretation of Mr. Nixon's
educational policies is that he doesn't know what he is
doing. If that is true, it is to be hoped that he will listen to those of us who are trying to tell him, as dispassionately as possible, that he is helping to kill private
higher education.
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See-ing
You can find any number of noble sentiments carved
on college buildings, but the one I've always looked for
and never found is this:

If nothing else, the purpose of education is to keep
those words firmly in front of people and to urge them
to govern their judgments by it. Perhaps with some luck
they may even influence the people around them to do
the same.
This little maxim is the principle that lies near the
root of much art and myth. The serpent is not merely a
serpent but Satan. Cordelia acts as if she hates her
father Lear, but she loves him more than the other
daughters. And so on.
Given the universality of great art and myth, should
we be surprised that this principle lies also very near
the heart of present-day realities?
The prison massacre at Attica, for example. Out of
that situation have come cries for reform, for more humane treatment of inmates. And those cries, predictably, are met with the epithet "bleeding heart." Having
a plain old heart is apparently OK, but when it starts
bleeding, society is in trouble. Don't let your sympathy
run to extremes, in other words. Prisoners are in jail to
be punished, and so what's all the fuss about bad food,
too few showers, a little use of the "nigger stick" now
and then? We put people in prison precisely so they
don't enjoy all the nice things of life outside. When
they see how bad it is in prison, you can bet they'll stay
straight once they get out.
Well, you lose your bet resoundingly. Agreed, the
logic is faultless. It makes perfect sense. The trouble is,
it bears no resemblance to actual human conduct.
Things are not always what they seem .
You harass a guy a little, or make him work and
sweat for a week it?- the same clothes, and what have you
produced? A penitent in your penitentiary? Not on
your life. His sheer revulsion is turning him into a
revolutionary. The prison guards and wardens by their
actions and attitudes represent society - nothing could
be clearer to a prisoner. If they're hateful, you'll keep

28

By C H ARLES VANDERS EE

on hating society once you get out.
And in fact the percentage of prisoners who commit
crimes and get stuck back behind bars is currently in New York State at least - something over 60%. If
the rest of us want to live in a reasonably safe society,
what could be clearer than the need to diminish a
prisoner's hate and desire for revenge - to stop this
foolish reinforcement of it by mean and brutal treatment in prison? Bleeding heart, nothing; we're talking
here about cold dry self-interest, the welfare and safety
of us all. Things are not always what they seem.
Then (to change the illustration but not the subject),
there's the mother of a college student I happen to know.
She paid a short visit to the university a couple of weeks
ago and then sent me a letter with her reactions. Coats
and ties used to be a tradition here among students, and
the trend to slovenliness is particularly irritating to
her. She takes this as a symbol of deterioration and lack
of pride. What will happen to the nation, she asks, when
these people come into control?
I can understand her interpretation. Dealing with
literature in class every day, I know how easy it is to
see SYMBOL in anything. Freud and Jung have battered the shores of common sense for some time now
with their waves of symboli'sm, and more and more people are running around thinking that a thing is NEVER
what it seems. Clothes could never be merely clothes.
So when I wrote a return letter it was not a putdown
but rather the presentation of an alternative hypothesis.
Coats and ties are expensive, and drycleaning costs
are going up. More and more of our students are coming
from poor families, as we expand black recruitment
and programs like Upward Bound . That's one reason
for a change in dress.
Probably more important, you just feel more comfortable in sloppy clothes, which let you sit on the
lawn or ride a bike through the rain (Lord save us from
the bikes this year!) without worrying about a stain or
a rip. Perhaps most important, scruffiness merely happens to be the current badge of identity among youth.
Adding everything up, if symbolism is what you want,
we can conclude that deterioration and lack of pride
are not necessarily involved at all. Instead, the current
dress is a symbol of good old American common sense,
practicality, comfort, and conformity. Things are not
necessarily what they seem, from the car window as
you're driving around town.
I guess, on the whole, we're doing a pretty bad job in
educating. Think before you judge; put yourself in the
other guy's place and ask how you'd react - such simple principles! In fact, why should you wait till college
to learn them?
The Cresset

